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TRANSFER AND CHOICE OF FEDERAL
LAW: THE APPELLATE MODEL
Robert A. Ragazzo*

Choice of law questions are among the most complicated in the
American procedural system. In cases in which state law supplies
the rule of decision, the laws of fifty sovereigns are potentially applicable to every dispute. State courts employ choice of law rules to
determine which state's law governs a particular controversy.1 Federal district courts exercising diversity jurisdiction employ the same
choice of law rules as the courts of the state in which they are
located.2
·
The choice of law problem is complicated by transfers of cases
from one district court to another within the federal system.3 In
Van Dusen v. Barrack,4 the United States Supreme Court held that
after the transfer of a diversity case on the defendant's motion from
a court that had the power to entertain the action, the transferee
court should apply the same law that the transferor court would
have applied.s This article considers whether and to what extent
the Van Dusen rule should apply to transferred cases containing
federal issues.
For illustrative purposes, assume that a plaintiff brings an action
pursuant to section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6
and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder,7 and alleges that the de-

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 1982, Fordham;
J.D. 1985, Harvard. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Seth Chandler, David Dow, Dennis
Duffy, Miguel Estrada, Laura Oren, Yale Rosenberg, Eugene Smith, and William P. Streng
for their thoughtful comments. The author also wishes to thank Judith Anthony, Mark Bennett, Christina Rouleau, Bethany Fitch, Shennie Patel, and Kevin Peter for their research
assistance.
1. See infra section III.A.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
3. The difficulty of determining the proper effect of transfer upon choice of law is eloquently demonstrated by the change of views of one eminent commentator within a five-year
period. Compare Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L
REv. 405, 501-03 (1955) [hereinafter Currie, Change of Venue] (supporting the application of
federal choice of law principles in transferred state law cases) with Brainerd Currie, Change
of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 341, 348 (1960) (arguing
that transferor state law should apply).
4. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
5. See infra section I.B.1.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 {1994).
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fendant negligently committed fraud in connection with a proxy solicitation. The plaintiff files a lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff chooses
this court because it lies within the Second Circuit, which permits
negligence actions under section 14(a).8 In light of the broad jurisdictional and venue rules that apply to securities fraud actions, the
Southern District of New York is a proper forum. 9 The court then
transfers the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which lies within the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth
Circuit has held that section 14(a) requires proof of scienter.10
Should the Northern District of Ohio apply the law of the Second
or the Sixth Circuit? The plaintiff's ability to proceed with the case
depends on the answer to this question.
Among the early cases, two lines of authority developed. Prior
to Van Dusen, federal courts considered whether to transfer cases
containing federal issues to circuits that interpreted federal law less
favorably from the plaintiff's perspective. These courts generally
assumed that transferee federal law would apply and held that an
unfavorable change of law from the plaintiff's perspective did not
prevent a transfer.11 After Van Dusen, federal courts continued to
take the view that transferee federal law applies after a permanent
transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).12
Four years after Van Dusen, Congress passed the Multidistrict
Litigation Act (MDL Act).13 The MDL Act allowed the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to consolidate cases for
8. See Wtlson v. Great Am. Indus., 855 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1988); Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988); Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O'Brien, 11 F.3d 1255,
1256-58 {5th Cir. 1994) (noting that under the Securities Exchange Act, service of process is
nationwide); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that under the Securities Exchange Act, venue lies in any district where any portion of
the defendant's illegal conduct occurred), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 923 (1987).
10. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428-31 (6th Cir.), cert. de·
nied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
11. See infra section 11.A.1.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); see infra note 149 and accompanying text. Section 1404(a)
transfers are premised on the propriety of the original venue. If the original venue is im·
proper, transfer is accomplished pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) {1988). Section 1406 transfers pose no choice of law problems. If the original venue is improper, the plaintiff's act of
filing cannot establish a choice of law baseline for subsequent proceedings. It is well accepted that transferee law applies after § 1406 transfers. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 243 & n.8 (1981); Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 64344 {9th Cir. 1983); Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1109-11 (5th Cir. 1981). Consequently, references in this article to permanent transfers are to§ 1404(a) transfers.
13. Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 {1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1988)).
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pretrial proceedings.14 The MDL Act contemplated that transferred cases would be remanded to their original fora after the completion of pretrial proceedings.15 MDL transferee courts, relying
on Van Dusen with little analysis, applied transferor law on federal
issues. These courts neglected to consider whether the Van Dusen
rule should apply to federal issues and what difference, if any, the
MDL posture of the case made.16
Thus, in the early 1980s it was well established that transferee
federal law applies after permanent transfers and transferor federal
law applies after MDL transfers. Then, in 1984, Professor Richard
Marcus wrote a seminal article on transfer and choice of federal
law.17 Marcus viewed Van Dusen as based on federalism considerations that were irrelevant in the federal issue context.18 He argued
that every federal judge has the ability and the duty to determine
the content of federal law independently, without regard to the positions judges in other federal circuits have taken. Marcus called
this conclusion the principle of competence.19 Based on this principle, Marcus argued that a district court should apply the law of its
own circuit after both MDL and permanent transfers.20
In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 21 which
involved an MDL transfer, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit became the first court to consider
in depth the effect of transfer on choice of federal law. Relying
heavily on Marcus's analysis and his principle of competence, the
court held that transferee federal law should apply. The court considered whether there was any reason to distinguish MDL transfers
from permanent transfers and held, as Marcus had suggested, that
there was not.22 Korean Air Lines changed the legal landscape.
Although Korean Air Lines confirmed the view that transferee federal law applies after permanent transfers, it repudiated the view
that transferor law applies after MDL transfers. Other courts have
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
16. See infra section 11.A.2.
17. See Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal
Judicial System, 93 YALE LI. 677 (1984).
18. See id. at 693-701; see also infra text accompanying notes 160-68.
19. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 702-09; see also infra text accompanying notes 169-70.
20. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 709-19; see also infra text accompanying note 171.
21. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122 (1989).
22. 829 F.2d at 1174-76; see also infra section Il.C.
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uniformly followed Korean Air Lines in both contexts.23 As a consequence, the federal courts are approaching a new consensus that
transferee federal law applies regardless of the type of transfer.
Recent commentators have challenged Marcus's views and the
Korean Air Lines case and have urged that transferor law should
govern federal issues after both MDL24 and permanentzs transfers.
The Marcus article and the Korean Air Lines decision have also
been undercut to some extent by the Supreme Court's decision in
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 26 which held that after the transfer of a
diversity case on the plaintiff's motion, transferor law continues to
apply on state law issues. The Court viewed Van Dusen as protecting more than federalism concerns. It believed that Van Dusen was
also based on the desirability of divorcing transfer decisions from
choice of law considerations and preserving whatever advantages
are entailed in the plaintiff's right to pick the forum. 27
In light of recent developments, a reexamination of the position
that transferee federal law applies regardless of the context is in
order. This article argues that the consensus that existed prior to
the Marcus article and the Korean Air Lines case, although not
based upon the most thorough analysis, comprises the better view:
transferee federal law should apply after permanent but not MDL
transfers.
Part I of this article examines the Supreme Court's precedents
in the analogous forum non conveniens and diversity transfer contexts. Part II examines relevant legal developments with regard to
the transfer of cases containing federal issues. Part III considers
which law should apply after the permanent transfer of a case containing federal issues and concludes, consistent with the weight of
authority, that transferee federal law should apply. Part III, however, supplies a different rationale for this result than the currently
prevailing view. In the absence of controlling Supreme Court authority, when a case containing federal issues is commenced in federal court, a district court does not ask which circuit deserves to
have its law applied or utilize any choice of law principle. A district
court applies tbe law of its circuit because its circuit court is the
23. See infra section 11.D.
24. See, e.g., Ross Daryl Cooper, The D.C. Circuit Review, September 1987 - August 1988,

The Korean Air Disaster: Choice of Law in Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1145 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Tom M. Fmi, Note, The Scope of the Van Dusen Rule in Federal-Question
Transfers, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 49.
26. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
27. 494 U.S. at 524-30; see also infra section I.B.3.
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next-higher court in the federal hierarchy - the court that will review its decisions. After a permanent transfer, a transferee district
court should continue to apply the law of its circuit on federal issues
because its circuit, rather than the transferor circuit, has appellate
jurisdiction over the case. I call this view the "appellate model."
Part ID also concludes that Van Dusen and Ferens do not require a
departure from the appellate model.
Although the appellate model reaches the same result as the
prevailing weight of authority in the permanent transfer context, it
reaches a different result in the MDL context. Part IV argues that
after an MDL transfer the transferee court should continue to apply
transferor federal law. The MDL scheme contemplates that at the
conclusion of pretrial proceedings, cases will be remanded to their
original fora for trial. As a consequence, any appeal after remand,
trial, and final judgment will be to the transferor court of appeals,
and the MDL district court should apply that circuit's law.

I.

ANALOGOUS SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY

At present, the Supreme Court has not addressed the effect of
transfer on the law applicable _to federal issues. Any relevant
Supreme Court learning must be derived from the Court's decisions
in the forum non conveniens and diversity transfer contexts. These
cases suggest that the plaintiff has a privilege in the forum selection
process that includes the right to influence choice of law. This
choice of law advantage is viewed as a vested right that should not
be disturbed by transfer. Part I examines the plaintiff's venue and
choice of law privileges and their potential application to the federal issue context.
A.

The Plaintiff's Venue Privilege

The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed a plaintiff's venue privilege in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert. 28 Prior to 1948, transfers within
the federal system were impossible. In Gulf Oil, the Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of a case pursuant to the common law
doctrine of forum non conveniens so that a lawsuit legitimately
brought in one federal district could be tried in another.29 As a
28. 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947).
29. See 330 U.S. at 505-12. The Gulf Oil decision has been questioned on the ground that
forum non conveniens dismissals are inappropriate if the plaintiff has chosen a legitimate
forum. Cf. Currie, Change of Venue, supra note 3, at 420-34 (arguing that forum non conveniens dismissals are inappropriate, even in the absence of transfer provisions, when the
alternate forum lies within the federal system); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and
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consequence, for a short time the forum non conveniens doctrine
served as a proxy for transfer.3o
The Gulf Oil Court identified two categories of factors that are
relevant in ruling on forum non conveniens motions. First, the district court must consider private interest factors, which include access to sources of proof, availability and cost of securing the
attendance of witnesses, potential for viewing premises, ability to
enforce any judgment, relative obstacles and advantages to a fair
trial, and "all other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive."31 Second, the district court
must consider public interest factors, such as preventing docket
congestion, limiting the burden of jury duty to communities with a
relation to the litigation, making it possible for citizens to view proceedings with an impact on their communities, and holding the trial
of a diversity case before a judge conversant with local law,32
In applying this multifactor balancing test, the Court noted that
the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to great respect: "[U]nless
the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."33 Because forum non
conveniens and transfer decisions are analogous, the Gulf Oil factors apply in the transfer context. However, because transfer involves less significant consequences to the plaintiff than a forum
non conveniens dismissal, a lesser showing of inconvenience is rethe Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. Rev. 781, 841-46 (1985) (arguing
that forum non conveniens should be replaced by more stringent standards for jurisdiction).
30. In 1948, in response to the problems posed by Gulf Oil, Congress passed the first
statute allowing transfer from one legitimate federal forum to another "[f]or the convenience ·
of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice." Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No.
80-773, 62 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988)). Federal courts now
employ the forum non conveniens doctrine only when the alternative venue lies beyond the
federal system. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
31. 330 U.S. at 508.
32. 330 U.S. at 508-09. One commentator has suggested that the Gulf Oil factors are
often disregarded. See Peter G. McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Con·
veniens, 13 S. Ju.. U. LJ. 191, 239-42 (1989).
33. 330 U.S. at 508. On the specific facts before it, the Court held that the district court
did not err in finding that Gulf Oil was "one of those rather rare cases where the [forum non
conveniens] doctrine should be applied." 330 U.S. at 509. Respect for the plaintiff's original
choice of venue may have decreased over time. See Edmund W. Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code: In the Interest ofJustice or Injustice, 40 IND. W. 99, 101 (1965) (observing that
district courts "have granted transfer on a steadily decreasing showing of inconvenience");
McAllen, supra note 32, at 240 (identifying a " 'liberal trend' in forum non conveniens" according to which "courts are becoming more likely to grant a dismissal on the basis of a
particular showing of inconvenience than they would have been in years past"); Stein, supra
note 29, at 831 (noting a "dramatic increase in the use of forum non conveniens" between
1965 and 1985).
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quired to obtain transfer.34 As a result, the plaintiff's venue privilege continues to be recognized in the transfer context but has less
weight than in the forum non conveniens context.35
One may fairly question why the plaintiff should have a right
superior to the defendant to influence venue. Although some commentators have tried to justify this right based on characteristics
that distinguish plaintiffs from defendants,36 the plaintiff's venue
privilege is best explained as an efficiency mechanism.37 The legislature creates rules of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue that limit potential fora but often identify more
than one forum as proper. Some actor must decide which of these
34. See, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (finding that Congress intended the phrase "[fjor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice"
in§ 1404(a) to allow courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience than
traditionally required under a forum non conveniens analysis).
35. See, e.g., 349 U.S. at 32; Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, 598 F. Supp. 734,
736 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("[P]Iaintiff's forum selection is significantly less weighty under Section
1404(a) than under forum non conveniens."); Air Express Intl. Corp. v. Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Conn. 1984) (stating that under § 1404(a) plaintiff's choice of forum is controlling absent a showing of inconvenience); Cheeseman v. carey,
485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y.) ("[P]laintiff's choice of forum is entitled to respect ••.•"),
affd. on other grounds, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geogra-

phy as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court,
40 UCLA L. REv. 423, 512 (1992) (arguing that in enacting§ 1404(a), Congress intended that
courts give substantial deference to the plaintiff's initial choice of forum). Given the flexible
nature of the Gulf Oil analysis, it is not surprising that there is a large variance in how much
deference particular courts give to the plaintiff's choice of forum. See David E. Steinberg,
The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 443, 488-94
(1990).
.
36. See, e.g., David E. Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases:
An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by Venue Restrictions, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 82, 85 (1968) (arguing that the plaintiff's venue privilege flows from the
presumption that the plaintiff has been wronged by the defendant); Fini, supra note 25, at 53
(attempting to justify the plaintiff's venue privilege on the grounds that the plaintiff is the
party who has allegedly been wronged and defendants have more resources to litigate in
inconvenient fora than plaintiffs); Stowell R.R. Kelner, Note, "Adrift on an Uncharted Sea":
A Survey of Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 639-40
(1992) (supporting a plaintiff's venue privilege because "for any adjudicatory system to work
••• it must •.• attract potential plaintiffs"); see also Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and
Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 440, 464 (1982) (arguing that the pro-plaintiff bias of
the venue and choice of law system flows from an attempt "to regulate a great common
market and to rationalize a stubborn federalism").
37. Professor McAllen argues persuasively:
The only identifiable characteristic that plaintiffs all share is that they chose to institute
litigation. Some are wealthier than the defendants they sue, some are poorer. Some
seek affirmative relief, others seek declaratory relief. Some claim to be victims, others
claim not to have victimized. Some are individuals, some are corporations, some are
governments or government agencies. It makes no more sense to confer a substantive
law advantage on all plaintiffs than it would to confer a similar advantage on all who
happened to wear blue last Tuesday.
McAllen, supra note 32, at 237 n.222; see also Kelner, supra note 36, at 618-22 (summarizing
case law and pointing out that the courts have not thought this problem through clearly).

710

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:703

proper fora will hear the lawsuit.38 Allowing the parties to select
the venue rather than the judge saves systemic resources.39 Allowing the plaintiff to select the venue rather than the defendant is
more efficient because it involves fewer steps and does not require
communication between the parties prior to the filing of a lawsuit.40
The presumption in favor of the plaintiff's initial choice of venue
prevents reconsideration except in extreme cases. Any other rule
would eliminate the efficiency gains inherent in removing the judicial system from the initial forum selection process.41
Thus, the plaintiff's venue privilege is well founded.42 One advantage this privilege confers on plaintiffs is the ability to influence
the choice of state law.43 Whether the plaintiff should retain this
choice of law advantage if the venue changes is the subject of the
next section.
B.

The Plaintiff's Choice of Law Privilege

1. Van Dusen v. Barrack
In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 44 the Supreme Court broadened the

plaintiff's venue privilege to include a choice of law privilege.45 In
Van Dusen, the Court held that transferor state law applies after the
permanent transfer of a diversity case on the defendant's motion.46
Two distinct strands of reasoning support this holding. The
Supreme Court viewed the plaintiff as having a privilege to pick the
initial forum - a privilege that confers certain vested rights upon
the plaintiff, including the ability to influence the choice of state
law. The Court believed that transfer should not disturb this privi38. See McAllen, supra note 32, at 242-51 (considering the models of judicial choice,
plaintiff's choice, and defendant's choice).
39. See id. at 247.
40. See id. at 248-49 & n.264 (noting that the defendant's choice model would require
procedures intervening between the plaintiff's decision to sue and the defendant's choice of
forum).
41. See id. at 244-51; see also Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the
Federal Courts: A Reconsideration of Erie Principles, 79 KY. W. 231, 249 (1990-91) ("If the
presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice is strong, the forum non conveniens inquiry will
consume relatively few resources •••• ").
42. But see Stein, supra note 29, at 816-17, 844-46 (arguing that the plaintiff's venue
privilege is a vestige of a time when rules of personal jurisdiction sharply limited the plaintiff's choice of fora and that this privilege should be eliminated in light of modem jurisdictional theory).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
44. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
45. See also Fmi, supra note 25, at 53 (arguing that the plaintiff's venue privilege often
includes a choice of law privilege).
46. See 376 U.S. at 626-40.
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lege. The Court also rested its holding on federalism grounds and
on the policies underlying Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 47 Both
strands of analysis are considered below.
The Van Dusen Court advanced two rationales for its holding
that are premised on the notion that the plaintiff ~s venue privilege
includes a choice of law privilege. First, the Supreme Court evinced
concern that allowing transfer to change the applicable law would
prejudice the plaintiff.48 The Court was disturbed that in some
cases the transferee forum would refuse to entertain claims that
would have been actionable in the transferor forum. 49 In such circumstances, a transfer motion would be the functional equivalent of
a motion to dismiss. The Court noted that transfers, like forum non
conveniens dismissals,5o had previously been granted with conditions that allowed the action to proceed in the transferee forum. 51
Applying transferor law removes any concern that changing the applicable law will prejudice the plaintiff and dispenses with the need
for conditional transfers.52
In this regard, the Supreme Court examined "the history and
purposes of§ 1404(a)" and found that the transfer statute "should
be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing
with the placement of litigation in the federal courts and generally
intended, on the basis of convenience and fairness, simply to authorize a change of courtrooms."53 In the Court's view, the transfer
statute "was not designed to narrow the plaintiff's venue privilege
or to defeat the state-law advantages that might accrue from the
exercise of this venue privilege."54
Second, the Court noted that applying transferor law allows district courts to decide transfer questions based on efficiency considerations unhindered by concerns regarding a change in the
47. 304 U.S. 64 {1938).
48. See 376 U.S. at 628-30.
49. See 376 U.S. at 629-30.
50. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981) (noting that in making
a forum non conveniens motion, defendants agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum and waive any statute of limitations defense); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335,
364 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that to obtain forum non conveniens dismissals, defendants often agree to waive jurisdictional objections); McAllen, supra note 32, at
205 (noting that courts have conditioned forum non conveniens dismissal on the defendant's
promise to waive objections to personal jurisdiction, ·venue, or timeliness, to permit discovery
to proceed under the rules of the original forum, and to pay any judgment).
51. See 376 U.S. at 630-31 & n.27.
52. 376 U.S. at 630-31.
53. 376 U.S. at 636-37.
54. 376 U.S. at 635.

.

.
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applicable law.ss Section 1404(a) requires district courts to consider
"the convenience of parties and witnesses" and "the interest of justice" in deciding transfer motions.s6 Were a change of venue to result in a change in law, district courts would have to consider
whether prejudice to the plaintiff requires a denial of transfer based
on the interest of justice in some cases in which convenience factors
weighed in favor of transfer. The Van Dusen rule obviates the need
for this inquiry.s7
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly endorse a plaintiff's choice of law privilege, each of the above rationales implies
such a privilege. Each rationale makes sense only if the plaintiff,
through the initial choice of forum, has the right to establish a
choice of law baseline that is entitled to respect from the courts.
Prejudice implies more than detrimental change. Prejudice implies
the loss of vested rights. If the plaintiff lacks a choice of law privilege, a transfer would not be prejudicial even if the transferee forum would not recognize, or would apply less favorable law to, the
plaintiff's claim.ss The plaintiff is prejudiced only if the initial
choice of venue results in an entitlement to lock in the law applicable to the claim regardless of transfer.
The Van Dusen Court's notion that courts should base transfer
decisions solely on efficiency considerations also implies the existence of a plaintiff's choice of law privilege. Applying transferor law
is one way to accomplish this result. The Court could as easily have
held, however, that transferee law applies but that a change in law
is entitled to no weight in the transfer calculus.s9 Using the former
approach to protect the core concerns of section 1404(a) can only
be justified by an independent principle valuing the plaintiff's right
to influence applicable law.
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court's assumption that the
plaintiff is entitled to a greater opportunity than the defendant to
influence choice of law is questionable. Such a right is not inherent
in the plaintiff's venue privilege. That privilege rests on grounds
that are systemic and value neutral. The plaintiff is granted the
venue privilege for efficiency reasons, not because the plaintiff is
55. 376 U.S. at 636.
56. 28 U.S.C: § 1404{a) (1988).
57. See 376 U.S. at 636.
58. The cases applying transferee federal law have proceeded in part on this theory. See
infra text accompanying notes 136-45.
59. The Supreme Court in the forum non conveniens context, see infra text accompanying
notes 92-97, and the lower federal courts in the federal issue transfer context, see infra text
accompanying notes 146-48, have adopted this approach.
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more deserving than the defendant with respect to venue considerations. Despite these efficiency concerns, the plaintiff's right to
choose the forum is not absolute. Given the right circumstances,
defendants may remove state cases to federal court,60 transfer cases
within the federal system,61 and have cases dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds.62 If the defendant succeeds in vetoing the
plaintiff's choice of forum, there is no venue-related reason why
any choice of law advantage the plaintiff might otherwise have had
should be retained.
Certain plaintiff advantages tied to forum selection evaporate if
the defendant is successful in changing the forum. A plaintiff may
file in state court to impose more limited discovery on the defendant than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would allow. If the
defendant succeeds in removing the case, however, the Federal
Rules, with their broad discovery provisions, will apply and the
plaintiff will lose any discovery advantage.63 The plaintiff may file
in federal court in one region of tQ.e country in an attempt to influence the values of the judge or jury. Yet, if the defendant succeeds
in having the case transferred to a federal court in another region of
the country, the plaintiff will lose any regional advantage.64 A forum non conveniens dismissal always has the effect of relegating the
plaintiff to the law of another forum. 65
interesting question is
what, if anything, distinguishes choice of law in the transfer context
from other advantages the plaintiff loses upon change of forum.66

The

60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988) (allowing defendants to remove cases that are within
the district court's original jurisdiction).
61. See supra note 30.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
63. See Satellite Fm. Planning Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 394 & n.9 (D.
Del. 1986). The broad federal discovery provisions, see F'Bo. R. CIV. P. 26-37, are often a
significant factor in causing parties to choose federal over state court. See, e.g., Jerry
Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL Sron. 93, 98 (1980) (finding that 57% of attorneys surveyed cited the
superior rules of discovery as a reason for choosing federal court). Once a party removes the
case to federal district court, applicable federal rules will displace any conflicting state procedural rules. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-74 (1965).
64. For example, in Gulf Oil the plaintiff filed in federal court in New York, rather than
in Virginia where all events relevant to the litigation occurred, because the plaintiff believed
that a New York jury would be more comfortable in awarding the $400,000 sought by the
plaintiff. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 510 (1947). After the Supreme Court
affirmed a forum non conveniens dismissal to force the plaintiff to proceed in the Vrrginia
forum, the potential advantage of trying the case in front of a metropolitan jury was irretrievably lost. See also Henderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.-1950)
(transferring a case challenging the provision of racially separate facilities in a Kentucky
airport to the Eastern District of Kentucky).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
66. See Satellite, 633 F. Supp. at 394 (analogizing the elimination of the plaintiff's choice
of law privilege on transfer to the tactical advantages the defendant gains on removal).
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1\vo strong arguments suggest that any choice of law advantage
accruing to the plaintiff should not survive once the defendant successfully challenges the initial venue choice. Because of the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's venue choice, the defendant will
be able to justify a transfer only in extreme cases. The fact that the
plaintiff has picked a forum that is so inconvenient that transfer is
justified suggests that the plaintiff has engaged in manipulative or
vexatious behavior that the system should not tolerate. It is hard to
justify encouraging such behavior by granting the plaintiff a choice
of law privilege that survives transfer.67
There is, moreover, some overlap between venue and choice of
law considerations. To some extent, both depend on the center of
gravity of events. Thus, if the original forum is inappropriate, it is
likely that transferor law is also inappropriate. The Gulf Oil factors
are heavily based on the location of events.68 Traditional choice of
law principles favor applying the law of the place where the last act
necessary to confer a claim on the plaintiff occurred.69 Modern
choice of law principles favor applying the law of the jurisdiction
with the most significant relationship to the litigation.70 As a consequence, in the majority of transferred cases, transferee law will be
preferable to transferor law based on choice of law considerations
and thus is the appropriate per se position to adopt if the system
prefers a per se to an ad hoc rule.11
Because the arguments in support of a plaintiff's choice of law
privilege are weak, other factors supporting the result in Van Dusen
assume increased prominence. Van Dusen may be justified on the
basis of efficiency concerns similar to those that underlie the plaintiff's venue privilege. To prevent expenditure of systemic resources
through reconsideration of venue in a large number of cases, the
plaintiff's venue choice is entitled to substantial respect. The Van
Dusen Court noted that applying transferee law would give the defendant. an incentive to engage in gamesmanship and forum shopping and to make transfer motions for reasons unrelated to the core
values underlying section 1404(a): efficiency and convenience.72 In
part to prevent forum shopping by defendants, the Court rejected
67. But see Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 637 n.36 (1964) (rejecting this argument
to prevent transfer decisions from having outcome-detenninative effects).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
. 69. See infra text accompanying notes 197-200.
70. See infra text accompanying note 201.
71. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 698 ("[A]ny connection between the convenience of the
forum and the choice of law would point to preferring the law of the transferee [forum].").
72. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964).
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"the rather startling conclusion that one might 'get a change of law
as a bonus for a change of venue.' "73
The marginal efficiency benefit of the Van Dusen rule is unclear.
The plaintiff's venue privilege already contains a substantial disincentive to filing ill-founded transfer motions. A transfer motion
will not be granted unless there is a large inequity in the balance of
convenience. This rule should discourage most groundless transfer
motions.14 On the other hand, courts make transfer decisions according to an inherently uncertain multifactor balancing test.75 As
a consequence, the defendant will usually have colorable grounds to
argue in favor of a transfer if presented with the prospect of a
favorable change in law.76 Thus; Van Dusen increases to some extent the marginal efficiency of the venue system.
Federalism concerns provide the strongest support for the Van
Dusen holding. The Court noted that its holding was "supported by
the policy underlying Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. " 71 Erie rested in
large part on respect for state sovereignty78 and a concern that the
existence of federal diversity jurisdiction should not change the results in state law cases.79 Were transferee state law to apply, the
73. 376 U.S. at 636 (quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)).
74. See Comment, Choice of Law After Transfer of Venue, 15 YALE L.J. 90, 97 (1965)
(arguing that defendants have little ability to forum shop because "there [is] rarely ... more
than one most convenient forum, and it [is] dictated by objective factors over which the
defendant has no control").
75. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
76. See Kelner, supra note 36, at 616 ("[L]ack of defined standards allows parties to utilize statutory transfer for purely strategic purposes, such as ..• manipulating the applicable
law.").
77. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 637. For an interesting view on the relationship between Erie
and Van Dusen, see Maltz, supra note 41. Professor Maltz argues that federal diversity jurisdiction and Erie are based on a " 'limited impact theory' - the principle that federal instrumentalities should have only a limited impact on the overall process of governing the nation."
Id. at 239-40. He supports Van Dusen as a correct application of the limited impact theory
· because "by holding that a transfer [on] defendant's motion will not change the applicable
law, Van Dusen ensures that such a transfer will have no other effects." Id. at 257.
78. Justice Brandeis suggested that federal courts lacked the constitutional power to promulgate federal common law in diversity cases. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 7880 (1938).
79. See 304 U.S. at 74-75 (objecting to the creation of federal common law in diversity
cases, which "introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens" and "rendered
impossible equal protection of the law"); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
109 (1945) ("The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a
State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result."). As a consequence of the desire to achieve uniformity between federal and state courts in the same
location, the Supreme Court has held that a large number of seemingly procedural matters
are substantive for Erie purposes. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 555-56 (1949) (holding that requirements for shareholder derivative litigation are substantive); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (holding that a door-
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existence of federal diversity jurisdiction would change the result
that would have occurred in the courts of the transferor state because, assuming state courts in the transferor jurisdiction would not
have dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds,so transfers between state courts are impossible.Bl Were transferee state law to
apply in the federal system, plaintiffs would have an incentive to file
in state court to attempt to insulate their cases against transfer and
change of law.sz Defendants would have an incentive to remove
cases to federal court in an attempt to procure transfer and change
of law. Discouraging parties from choosing between federal and
state courts in the same location in an attempt to obtain more
favorable law is central to Erie. 83 Thus, the Van Dusen Court held
that "[a] change of venue under§ 1404 (a) generally should be, with
respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms."84
Because the Van Dusen Court's Erie analysis is the most satisfying ground for its decision, there is a temptation to dismiss the
other grounds. The grounds predicated upon the plaintiff's venue
and choice of law privileges, however, provide independent support
for the result in Van Dusen and appear to have primacy over the
Erie ground. The Court discussed Erie only at the conclusion of its
analysis of the effect of venue change on choice of law,ss after it had
already decided that the plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges required the application of transferor law.s6 The Van Dusen
Court noted that Erie applied only by analogy because Van Dusen
itself dealt with "a congressional statute apportioning the business
closing statute is substantive); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530,
532-34 {1949) {holding that the tolling of a statute of limitations is substantive); Guaranty
Trust, 326 U.S. at 108-10 (holding that the length of a limitations period is substantive);
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) {holding that choice of law
rules are substantive).
80. Van Dusen reserved decision in cases in which the state where the transferor district
court is located would have dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. See 316
U.S. at 640.
81. As a consequence, Van Dusen held that "the critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the State in which
the action was filed." 376 U.S. at 639.
82. Presumably the plaintiff would also attempt to defeat diversity and prevent removal
by joining marginal nondiverse parties as defendants. Although fraudulent joinder to destroy
diversity will be disregarded by the federal courts, see, e.g., Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959
F.2d 69, 72-74 {7th Cir. 1992), eliminating incentives for this kind of gamesmanship was a
core Erie concern. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
83. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1938) (noting the widespread criticism
of permitting reincorporation for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction and gaining
access to federal court and federal common law).
84. 376 U.S. at 639.
85. See 376 U.S. at 637-39.
86. See 376 U.S. at 626-37.
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of the federal courts."87 The Van Dusen Court appears to have conceived of its mission more as an exercise in interpreting section
1404(a) than in applying Erie.
2. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
The Supreme Court's decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reynoss
may appear to have undercut the existence of a plaintiff's venue
and choice of law privileges. Upon closer analysis, however, Piper
does little to contradict Gulf Oil or Van Dusen. In Piper, the legal
representative of the estates of five Scottish passengers who died in
the crash of a small commercial aircraft in Scotland brought suit in
a California state court against the manufacturers of the propeller
and the plane - both American corporations.8 9 The plaintiff admitted that she chose an American forum to take advantage of domestic law regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages.9o The
defendants removed the action and had it transferred to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. After
transfer, the defendants, presumably motivated at least in part by
the desire to obtain better law, moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds so that the case might be tried in Scotland.91
In affirming the district court's decision to dismiss, 92 the
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry." 93 The Court
relied on systemic factors in arriving at this conclusion. Because
"Li]urisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied," a
wide choice of fora is usually available to the plaintiff.94 Presumably, the plaintiff will bring the action in the forum that will apply
the most favorable legal rules. Were an unfavorable change in law
from the plaintiff's perspective to preclude application of the forum
non conveniens doctrine, the doctrine would seldom apply, even
87. 376 U.S. at 637.
88. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
89. See 454 U.S. at 238-40. Gaynell Reyno, the plaintiff, was a legal secretary to the
attorney that filed the suit She was appointed by a California court to represent the estates
of the deceased passengers. 454 U.S. at 239.
90. See 454 U.S. at 240. Scottish law does not recognize strict liability in tort, permits
only relatives to bring wrongful death actions, and limits recovery in wrongful death actions
to compensation for loss of support and society. 454 U.S. at 240.
91. See 454 U.S. at 240-42.
92. See 454 U.S. at 247-61.
93. 454 U.S. at 247.
94. 454 U.S. at 250.
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when the Gulf Oil factors pointed heavily in favor of an alternative
forum.9s

Piper went to some pains to distinguish rather than contradict
Van Dusen. Piper emphasized that Van Dusen involved an intrasystem transfer rather than a forum non conveniens dismissal.96 As a
consequence, the Van Dusen Court had available a mechanism that
the Piper Court did not: the ability to protect the plaintiff's choice
of law privilege and allow venue decisions to proceed uninhibited
by potential changes in the law.97 In the forum non conveniens
context, the only way to protect the plaintiff's choice of law privilege is to deny dismissal, which in some cases requires the trial to
proceed in an inconvenient forum. Thus, Piper may be viewed as
confined to the forum non conveniens context and may not disturb
any choice of law privilege that Van Dusen recognized in the transfer context.
Moreover, despite some harsh and categorical language,98 Piper
lends support to the existence of a plaintiff's choice of law privilege
even in the forum non conveniens context. The Court noted that
"if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable
change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court
may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice."99 The Court gave as an example the case in which "the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the
dispute." 10° Thus, the Piper Court agreed with Van Dusen that
change of venue should not be the functional equivalent of dismissal on the merits. Unless the plaintiff's original choice of forum
creates ~ vested right to the law this forum would have applied, it is
hard to understand why elimination of the plaintiff's claims through
change of venue causes any unfairness.
The Piper Court was also careful to limit its holding to the specific facts before it. The Court noted that an unfavorable change in
the law should not preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal "[a]t
95. See 454 U.S. at 247-51. The Court also relied on the desire to avoid burdening the
forum non conveniens inquiry with difficult choice of law questions. See 454 U.S. at 251; see
also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing Gulf Oil factors).
96. See 454 U.S. at 253.
97. See 454 U.S. at 253 n.20 (noting that Van Dusen cited decisions that "frequently
rested on the assumption that a change in law would have been unavoidable under common
law forum non conveniens, but could be avoided under § 1404(a)").
98. See supra text accompanying note 93.
99. 454 U.S. at 254.
100. 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.

February 1995]

The Appellate Model

719

least where· [a] foreign plaintiff named an American manufacturer
as defendant."101 A contrary result would make American fora inordinately attractive to foreign plaintiffs and increase the congestion of the American court system.102 The Court further
acknowledged that under Gulf Oil "a plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed." 103 It believed, however, that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum "applies with
less force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign."104 As a consequence, Piper holds only that an unfavorable
change in law should not be a significant forum non conveniens factor when the plaintiff is foreign.1os It does not necessarily undercut
an American plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges.
3. Ferens v. John Deere Co.
In Ferens v. John Deere Co., 106 the Supreme Court returned to
an issue that it had reserved in Van D'USen101 and held that transferor state law applies in diversity cases even when the plaintiff requests the transfer.10s In so doing, the Court confirmed the
existence of a plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges in
strong terms. The Ferens Court viewed Van D'USen as resting on
three independent considerations:
First, § 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state-law advantages
that exist absent diversity jurisdiction. Second,§ 1404(a) should not
create or multiply opportunities for forum shopping. Third, the decision to transfer venue under§ 1404(a) should turn on considerations
of convenience and the interest of justice rather than on the possible
prejudice resulting from a change of law.109

The Court held that these considerations require the application of
transferor state law without regard to which party requested the
transfer.110
With regard to the first Van D'USen factor, the Ferens Court believed that the plaintiff has a venue privilege that includes a choice
101. 454 U.S. at 251.
102. 454 U.S. at 252.
103. 454 U.S. at 241.
104. 454 U.S. at 255.
105. See McAllen, supra note 32, at 238 n.231 (arguing that Piper discusses "the question
of deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum, but only in the context of explaining why there
should be less deference when the plaintiff is a foreigner").
106. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
107. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 640 (1964).
108. See 494 U.S. at 519.
109. 494 U.S. at 523.
110. See 494 U.S. at 523.
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of law privilege,111 and that it would be wrong to eliminate the
plaintiff's choice of law advantage even when the plaintiff requests
the transfer. 112 This vision constitutes an extreme view of the plaintiff's choice of law privilege, because if the plaintiff requests the
transfer, the transferee forum might fairly be viewed as the plaintiff's chosen venue. 113 The plaintiff is allowed to control both
venue and choice of law even after, at the plaintiff's request, the
two cease to be linked.114
The Ferens Court viewed the second Van Dusen factor - discouraging forum shopping by defendants - as largely inapplicable
to plaintiff-initiated transfers. 115 Plaintiff forum shopping did not
trouble the Court because, in the Court's view, the venue and
choice of law privileges give the plaintiff the right to forum shop.116
The Court's rule, however, encourages strategic conduct by plaintiffs. After Ferens, plaintiffs are well advised to file in fora that provide the best plaintiffs' law without regard to convenience and then
seek a transfer to a more convenient venue when necessary. 117 The
Court failed to explain why the plaintiff should be allowed to engage in double forum shopping - once to pick the law and once to
pick the venue - or why the system should tolerate the inefficiencies attendant to such conduct.us Such a result might fairly be
viewed as multiplying the opportunities for forum shopping, a result
at odds even with Ferens's view of Van Dusen. 11 9
Applying the third Van Dusen factor, the Ferens Court believed
that application of transferor law is desirable to divorce transfer
111. See 494 U.S at 524 (citing "[t]he policy that § 1404(a) should not deprive parties of
state-law advantages").
112. See 494 U.S. at 524-27.
113. See 494 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. See 494 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff should not be
allowed "to have his cake and eat it too - to litigate in the more convenient forum that he
desires, but with the law of the distant forum that he desires").
115. See 494 U.S. at 527-28.
116. See 494 U.S. at 527 ("[E]ven without § 1404(a), a plaintiff already has the option of
shopping for a forum with the most favorable law."). For a reversal of the usual view and an
argument that courts should worry less about defendant forum shopping, see Stein, supra
note 29, at 826 n.199 ("The 'evil' of forum shopping is not that it is motivated by a desire to
manipulate the applicable law. Rather, it is that there is a disproportionate advantage bestowed on the plaintiff ••.•").
117. See 494 U.S. at 538 {Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "file-and-transfer ploy"
sanctioned by the Ferens majority).
118. Cf. Ursula Marie Henninger, Note,, The Plaintiff's Forum Shopping Gold Card:
Choice of Law in Federal Courts After Transfer of Venue Under Section 1404(a) - Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 26 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 809, 826-27 (1991) (arguing that plaintiffs should
not be able to shop for the most favorable law and the most convenient court).
119. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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considerations from choice of law.120 The Court asserted that "Van
Dusen also made clear that the decision to transfer venue under
§ 1404(a) should turn on considerations of convenience rather than
on the possibility of prejudice resulting from a change in the applicable law."121 It is hard to understand, however, how the plaintiff
can ever be prejudiced by a change in law pursuant to a transfer the
plaintiff requests or why the court should take such prejudice into
account.122 The Court's real concern in this area seems to be that a
contrary rule might burden the system with trials in inconvenient
fora - imposing unnecessary burdens on witnesses, jurors, and the
court123 - and violate the principle that" '[t]here is a local interest
in having localized controversies decided at home.' " 124 Were transferee law to apply, plaintiffs would have an incentive to file in inconvenient fora that provided the best law and decline to request
transfer.125 Although the defendant might request a transfer,126 or
the court might order one sua sponte,127 the other actors in the process might decline to seek transfer to force the plaintiff to live with
the consequences of the filing decision. In these cases, the judicial
system would be burdened with trying cases in inconvenient fora. 128
However, the cases in which both the defendant and the court
would concur in allowing the trial to proceed in an inconvenient
forum would seem to be minimal.
Noticeably absent from the Court's list of Van Dusen factors iS
any reference to Erie. ·The Ferens Court viewed Erie as providing
support for the first Van Dusen factor - that transfer should not
deprive the plaintiff of vested state law advantages129 - but did not
120. See 494 U.S. at 528-29; see also supra text accompanying note 59 (explaining how the
concern about divorcing choice of law and transfer decisions presumes a plaintiff's choice of
law privilege).
121. 494 U.S. at 528.
122. See 494 U.S. at 536 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the principle of volenti non
fit injuria suffices to allay" any concern that the plaintiff is prejudiced).
123. See 494 U.S. at 529.
124. 494 U.S. at 530 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)).
125. See 494 U.S. at 529.
126. See John D. CUrrivan, Note, Choice of Law in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue,
63 CoRNELL L. REv. 149, 156 (1977) (concluding that a plaintiff who files in an inconvenient
forum can usually count on the defendant to make a transfer motion).
127. See 494 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting); I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343
F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1965) (noting that the district court has the power to effect§ 1404(a)
transfers sua sponte); Kirby v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Assn., 755 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D.D.C.
1990) (same).
128. See 494 U.S. at 530 ("The desire to take a punitive view of the plaintiff's actions
should not obscure the systemic costs of litigating in an inconvenient place.").
129. See 494 U.S. at 524.
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view Erie policies as independently significant. Moreover, the result in Ferens seems squarely at odds with Erie, as Justice Scalia
argued in a vigorous dissent joined by three other Justices. The Ferens rule allows plaintiffs to use the federal courts to obtain advantages they could not obtain in state court.130 In selecting state fora,
plaintiffs must choose between venue and choice of law advantages
when these advantages reside in different states.131 Ferens allows
the plaintiff simultaneously to reap both sets of advantages. As a
consequence, the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction has the
potential to change outcomes in cases governed by state law and
gives the plaintiff an incentive to file in federal rather than state
court in a given location.132 Preventing this kind of forum shopping
was a central concern of Erie.133
C.

Conclusion

In Gulf Oil and Van Dusen, the Supreme Court implied that the
plaintiff has venue and choice of law privileges that should not be
disturbed by transfer. These privileges survived Piper ·and were
strengthened by Ferens. The Ferens Court's relegation of Erie principles to secondary status demonstrates that it is incorrect to view
Van Dusen as based purely on' Erie concerns. As a consequence,
the plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges, as well as the
other Van Dusen factors emphasized by the Ferens Court, must be
taken seriously in the federal issue context.

II.

THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL QUESTION TRANSFERS

When courts have permanently transferred cases containing federal issues within the federal system, they have uniformly applied
transferee federal law. In this context, the courts have relied on the
theoretical uniformity of federal law and taken the view that Van
Dusen is inapplicable. By contrast, after MDL transfers, the federal
courts initially applied transferor federal law based on Van Dusen,
with little explanation. In re Korean Air Lines Disa~ter of Septem130. See 494 U.S. at 533-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Maltz, supra note 41, at 257 (arguing
that Ferens is inconsistent with Erie because it gives "the plaintiff an option that he would not
have had in the absence of federal diversity jurisdiction"); Henninger, supra note 118, at 826
(accusing the Ferens majority of "apparently forg[etting] the policies which supported the
Erie decision").
131. See 494 U.S. at 536 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See 494 U.S. at 536 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he significant federal
judicial policy" in favor of uniformity between federal and state courts in the same location
"is reduced to a laughingstock if it can so readily be evaded through filing-and-transfer").
133. See supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
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ber 1, 1983134 held that transferee federal law also applies after an
MDL transfer.13s Since that decision, a consensus has developed
that transferee federal law applies after both permanent and MDL
transfers. This Part examines the history of federal question
transfers.

A.

The Early Cases

1. Permanent Transfers
The first significant case to consider the effect of permanent
transfer on choice of federal law was Clayton v. Warlick. 136 In this
case, the plaintiff brought a federal patent infringement action in
the United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina. The defendant moved to transfer to the Northern District
of Illinois. The plaintiff candidly admitted that he chose to proceed
in North Carolina because the Fourth Circuit's law on an important
patent issue was more favorable to him than the Seventh Circuit's.131 The district court granted the transfer motion,138 and the
Fourth Circuit held that mandamus was not available to review the
district court's decision.139
The court also noted on the merits of the mandamus question
that the district court had not abused its discretion in transferring
the case.140 The Fourth Circuit assumed that the Northern District
of Illinois would apply Seventh Circuit law to the case and believed
that tli.is result presented no impediment to transfer. The court
viewed federal law as theoretically uniform and, therefore, believed
that any difference between the views of the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits was irrelevant to the tr~sfer decision:
[T]he same law, the federal patent law, will be applied wherever [the
case] is tried. We are not impressed by the argument that such transfer should be denied because of an alleged conflict of decision between this Circuit and the Seventh on an important question of law
involved in the case. If there be such conflict, this presents a matter
for consideration by the Supreme Court on application for certiorari,
not for consideration by a district judge on application for transfer
134. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122 (1989).
135. 829 F.2d at 1176.
136. 232 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1956).
137. 232 F.2d at 700-01.
138. Clayton v. Swift & Co., 137 F. Supp. 219 (W.D.N.C. 1956), mandamus denied, 232
F.2d 699.
139. See 232 F.2d at 706.
140. 232 F.2d at 706.
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). We have no sympathy with shopping
around for forums .... "[T]he courts of one District or Circuit must be
presumed to be as able and as well qualified to handle litigation as
those in another."141
The Second Circuit's decision in H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon142 followed the result and reasoning of Clayton.143 In
Green, the Second Circuit refused to grant a writ of mandamus
against a district judge who had transferred a federal securities action from a federal court in New York to one in Alabama.144 The
court squarely rejected the argument that a detrimental change in
law from the plaintiff's perspective was a factor to consider in connection with a transfer motion. Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second
Circuit relied on the theoretical uniformity of federal law:
A plaintiff may not resist the transfer of his action to another district
court on the ground that the transferee court will or may interpret
federal law in a manner less favorable to him.... The federal courts
comprise a single system applying a single body of law, and no litigant
has a right to have the interpretation of one federal court rather than
that of another determine his case.145
Neither Clayton nor Green dealt squarely with the choice of law
question. Both courts assumed that transferee federal law would
apply and held that a detrimental change in law from the plaintiff's
perspective was not a factor in the transfer calculus.146 In this regard, Clayton and Green prefigured Piper rather than Van Dusen.147
They divorced choice of law from the efficiency considerations that
should otherwise govern transfer decisions by holding that a change
in the law was not a relevant transfer factor. It presumably fell to
141. 232 F.2d at 706 (quoting Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp. v. United States Indus.
Chems., Inc., 140 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1944)).
142. 312 F.2d 650 {2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
143. The Second Circuit's seminal decision in Green was prefigured in the lesser-known
case of Ackert v. van Pelt Bryan, 299 F.2d 65 {2d Cir. 1962), in which the court, over a strong
dissent by Judge Friendly, see 299 F.2d at 71-72, allowed the permanent transfer of a case to a
circuit that would probably dismiss the plaintiff's federal claim. The court assumed that the
transferee court would apply the law of its own circuit after the transfer. See 299 F.2d at 69.
To the contrary is Ruskay v. Reed, 225 F. Supp. 581 {S.D.N.Y. 1963), in which the district
court exercised its discretion in refusing to transfer a case to a circuit that would not recognize the plaintiff's claim. See 225 F. Supp. at 583.
144. See 312 F.2d at 654.
145. 312 F.2d at 652.
146. One court has interpreted a plaintiff's desire to avoid the less favorable law of another circuit as a factor affirmatively supporting the defendant's transfer motion. See
Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y.), affd. on other grounds, 623 F.2d 1387
(2d Cir. 1980); see also Ziegler v. Dart Indus., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (D. Del. 1974}
(assuming that transferee federal law applies after a permanent transfer and denying the
plaintiff's motion for transfer to a circuit with more favorable law).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57, 93-95.
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the transferee courts themselves to determine which circuit's law to
apply in these cases.148 In later cases that postdate Van Dusen,
transferee courts applied the federal law of their own circuits in accordance with Clayton and Green; they argued, with little analysis,
that Van Dusen was limited to the state law context and that the
theoretical uniformity of federal law required the application of
transferee circuit precedent.149
Clayton, Green, and their progeny rest on a questionable premise. While Clayton and Green insist that federal law is theoretically
uniform, both cases demonstrate that federal law is not uniform in
practice and that this lack of practical uniformity has significant
consequences for the parties. The plaintiffs in Clayton and Green
148. See Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, 598 F. Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (leaving the choice of which circuit's law to apply in federal question cases to the
transferee court); see also Air Express Intl. Corp. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 889, 893 (D. Conn. 1984).
149. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1065
n.19 (3d Cir. 1976); Satellite Fm. Planning Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 393-94
(D. Del.1986); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) i 98;2.67, at 91,712 & n.13 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1981}; see also Henry J. Friendly,
The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JoHN's L REv. 406, 412 (1972} (viewing Van
Dusen as "limited to choices of state law"). After Van Dusen, potential transferor courts
continued to assume, as Clayton and Green had, that transferee federal law would apply after
a transfer. See Ziegler, 383 F. Supp. at 364-65; Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 367
F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (S.D.N.Y.1973); cf. United States v. Barrientos, 485 F. Supp. 789, 791-93
(E.D. Pa. 1980} (suggesting that transferee federal law applies after the transfer of a criminal
case). But see Oldfield v. Alston, 77 F.R.D. 735, 743 & n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (applying transferor federal law after a permanent transfer).
The American Law Institute (ALI), in the context of recommending the application of
transferee federal law after the permanent consolidation of mass tort cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 285-87, has recently suggested that there is a split of authority on the
federal law applicable to a permanently transferred case. See ALI, CoMPLEX LmGATION
PRoracr § 6.08 cmt. b, note 4 (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 5, 1993) [hereinafter CLP]. However, all the permanent transfer cases cited by the ALI to demonstrate sµch a split are cases
in which federal statutes incorporated state limitations periods and the transferee court applied the same limitations period that the transferor court would have applied. See Sargent v.
Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974); Thom v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 523 F. Supp. 1193, 1197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp.
722, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1980), affd., 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); Brick v. Dominion Mortgage
& Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 299 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp.
1123, 1125 (S.D. W. Va. 1973}; see also Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402,
406 (2d Cir. 1975) (§ 1407 transfer); Railing v. United Mine Workers, 429 F.2d 780, 781 (4th
Cir.1970), revg. 276 F. Supp. 238, 241 (N.D. W. Va. 1967) (§ 1404(a) transfer}, vacated, 401
U.S. 486 (1971); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 'I 96,015, at 91,566-67 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977) (§ 1407 transfer). At the time
they were decided, these cases involved a straightforward application of Van Dusen to state
law issues. As a result, they cannot properly stand for the proposition that transferor federal
law applies after a permanent transfer. See infra note 191 (describing the modem view).
Thus, in Green, one of the landmark cases supporting the application of transferee federal
law, the Second Circuit assumed that transferor state law would govern the limitations period
applicable to a federal securities claim just as transferor law would govern any other state
issue. See 312 F.2d at 652-53. The ALi's suggestion that there is a conflict on the federal law
applicable to permanently transferred cases is simply.incorrect.
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chose the initial fora, and the defendants moved to transfer, in large
part due to the differences in federal law across the country. Moreover, the refusal of the more recent cases to give substantial consideration to the application of Van Dusen in the federal issue context
is cause for concern. Nevertheless, as Part III demonstrates, Clayton and Green reached the correct result for the correct reason.
2. MDL Transfers

The MDL Act allows the JPML to consolidate cases involving
common questions of fact for pretrial purposes.150 The first MDL
court to consider the impact of transfer on choice of federal law was
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp. 151 This case involved civil antitrust actions that had
been commenced in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of venue. In
deciding this motion, the MDL court applied the law of the D.C.
Circuit.152 The court cited Van Dusen without discussion and provided no justification for its choice of transferor federal law. The
result may have seemed obvious to the court because both parties
agreed that the Van Dusen rule applied.153
This result, however, is far from obvious. There are at least two
factors that potentially distinguish Van Dusen from Philadelphia
Housing Authority: Van Dusen involved state law issues and a permanent transfer pursuant to section 1404(a), and Philadelphia
Housing Authority involved federal issues and a pretrial transfer
pursuant to section 1407. The court in Philadelphia Housing Authority made no attempt to determine what difference, if any, these
potential distinguishing factors made. It did not consider whether
the line of authority established by Clayton and Green, which supported the application of transferee federal law in the permanent
transfer context, applied in the MDL context and survived Van Dusen. Nevertheless, in In re Plumbing Fixtures Litigation, 154 the
JPML agreed with Philadelphia Housing Authority and asserted,
without analysis, that transferor federal law applies after section
1407 transfers.155 Prior to In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sep150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
309 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
See 309 F. Supp. at 1054-55.
See 309 F. Supp. at 1055.
342 F. Supp. 756 (J.P.M.L 1972).
See 342 F. Supp. at 758.
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tember 1, 1983, 156 these cases were uniformly followed with little
discussion or analysis.157
B.

The Marcus Article

A 1984 law review article by Professor Richard Marcus represents the first in-depth examination of the effect of transfer on the
law applicable to federal issues.158 Marcus took the view that transferee federal law should apply in all circumstances, without regard
to whether the transfer was permanent or for pretrial purposes pursuant to the MDL Act.159 He based this conclusion on the fundamental differences between diversity and federal question cases.
Marcus argued that Van Dusen principally protects two Erie policies in the diversity context: achieving uniformity of result between
federal and state courts in the same location and preserving the integrity of state law.160 These policies are irrelevant in the federal
question context.161
Marcus acknowledged that Van Dusen also proceeds on a venue
privilege theory that is potentially applicable to federal issues.162
Relying on Piper, he discounted the general existence of this privilege and argued that it applied only in diversity cases.163 In Marcus's view, a plaintiff in a diversity case receives a choice of law
privilege as a corollary to a venue privilege as a matter of necessity.
Although Congress has the power to adopt choice of law rules in
diversity cases, it has chosen not to. Moreover, although many have
argued that the federal courts should fashion common law rules to
156. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122 (1989).
157. See, e.g., Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975);
In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1468-70 (D. Colo. 1987);
Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 559 n.5 (D.NJ. 1982); In re Haven Indus. Inc. Sec.
Litig., 462 F. Supp. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 96,015, at 91,568 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (D. Mass. 1975); Stirling v.
Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 511 F.2d 1030
(2d Cir. 1975); In re Four Seasons· Sec. Laws Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219, 228 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
158. See Marcus, supra note 17.
159. See id. at 708-12 (discussing § 1404(a) transfers); id. at 716-19 (discussing § 1407
transfers).
160. See id. at 693-96.
161. Id. at 696.
162. See id. at 696-97.
163. See id. at 698-700; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 38-39 n.220 (1989) (arguing that the concept of a plaintiff's choice of law privilege "was shattered" in Piper).
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determine the applicable state law in diversity cases,164 the
Supreme Court held in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 16s and reaffirmed in Day & Zimmermann, In~. v. Cha/loner, 166 that in such cases a federal district court must apply the
choice of law rules of the state in which the district court is located.167 Because federal courts are incompetent to fashion independent choice of law rules in diversity cases, Marcus argued that
they had no option but to allow venue to determine choice of state
law by default.168
Believing that Van Dusen had no application in the federal
question context, Marcus searched for federal principles that would
determine the effect of a transfer on choice of federal law. Marcus
identified the principle of competence.169 Federal courts lack the
power to determine the substantive rules that will govern diversity
cases. By contrast, in the federal question context "the federal
courts have not only the power but the duty to decide [cases] correctly. . . . If a federal court simply accepts the interpretation of
another circuit without addressing the merits, it is not doing its
job."110 Because Marcus believed that every federal court of appeals has the duty, in the absence of controlling Supreme Court
authority, to apply its best view of federal law, he argued that transferee circuit law should apply after both permanent and MDL
transfers.111
Although Marcus's view has received nearly universal acceptance by the courts, certain aspects of his analysis deserve reconsideration. As discussed in Part I, Van Dusen and its progeny are not
based solely or primarily on Erie concems.112 Thus, Marcus's dismissal of Van Dusen as a state law case is questionable. Because
Piper seems limited to cases involving foreign plaintiffs, Marcus's
164. See, e.g., Currie, Change of Venue, supra note 3, at 459-64, 502-03 (arguing for the
application of federal choice of law principles on state law questions in the transfer context
and noting that this solution would probably undermine Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)); Seidelson, supra note 36, at 90-92 (arguing that federal choice of
law principles, rather than Klaxon, should apply to pendent state claims); Comment, supra
note 74, at 130-34 (supporting the application of federal interest analysis in choosing state
law in the transfer context and the overruling of Klaxon).
165. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
166. 423 U.S. 3 {1975).
167. The Klaxon rule has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Henninger, supra note 118, at
818 n.86 {collecting authorities).
168. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 700-01.
169. See id. at 702-09.
170. Id. at 702.
171. See id. at 705-19.
172. See generally supra section I.B.
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use of Piper to undercut support for a plaintiff's choice of law privilege is also questionable. Although I agree with Marcus that, in the
absence of controlling authority, every court generally has the capacity and the duty to apply its best view of federal law, I do not
believe that this principle requires the application of transferee federal law in all ca$es. As I argue below,173 choice of circuit law at the
district court level is more a matter of hierarchy within the federal
system than of competence. I agree with Marcus that transferee
federal law should apply_ after permanent transfers because the
transferee circuit will hear any appeal and, as Marcus argues, will
and should apply its own precedents.174 I also believe that these
concerns outweigh any contrary policy arguments advanced in Van
Dusen and Ferens. 115 In the MDL context, however, any appeal
after a trial will be to the transferor court of appeals. As a consequence, I contest Marcus's conclusion that transferee federal law
should apply after an MDL transfer.116
C.

Korean Air Lines

The first case to consider in depth the effect of a transfer on
applicable federal law was the D.C. Circuit's decision in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983. 111 In this case, plaintiffs brought multiple lawsuits relating to a Korean Air Lines flight
that was destroyed by a Soviet aircraft before it could complete its
journey from New York to South Korea. These lawsuits were consolidated for pretrial purposes pursuant to the MDL Act in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A central
issue in the case involved the application of the damage limitation
provisions of an international treaty - the Warsaw Convention as modified by an accord among airlines known as the Montreal
Agreement.178 The Montreal Agreement imposes a per-passenger
damage limitation of $75,000, provided that this limitation appears
on passenger tickets in ten-point type.179 The Korean Air Lines
tickets in question contained the limitation in eight-point type.180
173. See infra section m.B.
174. See infra section m.c.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 259-64.
176. See infra section IV.A.
177. 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a!fd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122 (1989).
178. See Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol: Order Approving Agreement, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
179. See id.
180. See 829 F.2d at 1172.
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Certain of the MDL cases had been transferred from district
courts in the Second Circuit, which had held that failure to follow
the typeface conventions of the Montreal Agreement prevents airlines from relying on the damage limitation provisions.181 The
MDL judge believed he was not bound by Second Circuit precedent
in the cases transferred from that circuit and, because the D.C. Circuit ·had not yet considered the question, was free to make his own
determination in all the MDL cases. The district court held that
Korean Air Lines' use of eight-point type did not preclude application of the damage limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention
and Montreal Agreement.182 The D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court decision on the merits.183
In addressing the choice of law question, the D.C. Circuit, in an
opinion by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, agreed with Professor
Marcus that Van Dusen rested principally on Erie concerns that
were irrelevant in the federal question context.184 The court
adopted Marcus's competence principle as affirmative support for
its decision that transferee federal law should apply.1ss The court
also believed that a contrary rule would unnecessarily complicate
MDL cases because it would require the MDL judge to apply different federal law to cases that had been transferred from different
circuits, and that the law of the case principle would insulate its
substantive decision from reversal in the Second Circuit following
remand and trial.186
Korean Air Lines is questionable for all the reasons that Marcus's theories, on which the court heavily relied, are questionable.
In addition, as Part IV demonstrates,187 the court's reliance on the
need to create efficient MDL procedures does not justify its application of transferee federal law in the MDL context. Moreover, as

181. See 829 F.2d at 1172; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol., on Mar. 14,
1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
182. See In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985),
affd., 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S.
122 (1989).
183. See 829 F.2d at 1173 (adopting the district court's opinion), affd. sub nom. Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). The Supreme Court opinion did not consider
the choice of law question.
184. See 829 F.2d at 1174-75.
185. See 829 F.2d at 1175 (relying on a passage from Marcus's article).
186. See 829 F.2d at 1175-76; infra section IV.B.2 (explaining and applying the law of the
case principle).
187. See infra section IV.C.3.
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Part IV also demonstrates,188 Judge Ginsburg's reliance on the law
of the case principle is unsound.

D. Conclusion
In the aftermath of Korean Air Lines, a consensus is developing
that transferee federal law applies after both permanent1s9 and
MDV 9D transfers. My research has disclosed no case decided after
Korean Air Lines that takes a contrary view.191 Indeed, bowing to
the new consensus, the JPML recently overruled its opinion in the
188. See infra section IV.B.2.
189. See Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 {9th Cir. 1994); Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc.
v. TBS Intl., Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1138 {5th Cir. 1992); Novodzelsky v. Astor, Weiss & Newman, No. CIV.A.94-2407, 1994 WL 527281, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept 22, 1994); In re College
Bound Consol. Litig., No. 93 Civ. 2348(MBM),1994 WL236163, at *6 n.1 {S.D.N.Y. May 31,
1994); Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F. Supp. 213, 222-24 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965, 968-69 (E.D. Wash. 1992); TBG
Inc. v. Bendis, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <{ 96,623, at 92,921-23
(D. Kan. Mar. 5, 1992); In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, Detroit, Mich. on Aug. 16,
1987, 791 F. Supp. 1204, 1212-13 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Isaac v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am.,
749 F. Supp. 855, 863 (E.D. Tenn. 1990); Greyhound Fin. Corp. v. Willyard, No. 87-C-0911B,
1989 WL 201094, at *13-*14. (D. Utah Dec. 26, 1989); cf. In re Pan Am. Corp., 950 F.2d 839,
847-48 {2d Cir. 1991) (applying Korean Air Lines after a transfer pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Act); Fossett Corp. v. Gearhart, 694 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (granting a transfer
and dismissing the idea that a transferee court must apply transferor law).
190. See Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 39-41 (2d Cir.1993); In re TMJ Implants Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 94-MD-1001, 1995WL16766, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 1995); In re Air Disaster, 819 F. Supp. 1352, 1369-71 (E.D. Mich. 1993); In re Integrated Resources Real Estate
Ltd. Partnerships Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 635-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Taxable Mun.
Bond Sec. Litig., 796 F. Supp. 954, 962-63 (E.D. La. 1992); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec.
Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 547-48 (D.NJ. 1992), affd., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to review the choice of law question because neither party challenged it on appeal), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct 1219 {1994); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Intl. Airport, 720 F.
Supp. 1493, 1496 (D. Colo. 1989).
191. Potentially inconsistent with Korean Air Lines are cases in which federal statutes
incorporated state limitations periods and the transferee court applied the same limitations
period that the transferor court would have applied. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8
F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1993) (§ 1404(a) transfer), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 883 {1994); In
re United Mine Workers, 854 F. Supp. 914, 916-22 (D.D.C. 1994) (§ 1407 transfer); In re
Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1256-58 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (§ 1404(a) transfer).
Prior to 1983, this result was thought to involve a straightforward application of Van Dusen
on state law issues. See supra note 149. It is now settled that the limitations question is
federal in nature. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13
(1983) ("[T]he choice of a limitations period for a federal cause of action is itself a question
of federal law."). As a consequence, most recent cases have applied transferee law in accordance with Korean Air Lines after both pretrial, see Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 39-41; Integrated
Resources, 815 F. Supp. at 635-37; Taxable Mun. Bond, 796 F. Supp. at 962-63; cf. In re Litig.
Involving Alleged Loss of Cargo, 772 F. Supp. 707, 710-11(D.P.R.1991) (applying transferee
law to determine which state's marine insurance contract law to adopt in an admiralty case),
and permanent transfers, see Wegbreit, 793 F. Supp. at 968-69; TBG, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. {CCH) at 92,921-23; cf. Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp.
69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying transferee law to a borrowed statute of limitations question
because the issue is procedural). However, the borrowed statute of limitations cases involve
federal law in an area where federal law is concededly not uniform. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at
1126-27. As a consequence, the cases applying transferor law are not inconsistent with Korean Air Lines. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1126 (accepting the rule that transferee federal law
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Plumbing Fixtures case,192 which was the foundation for the application of transferor law in the MDL context.193 The reasoning of
Korean Air Lines, however, is suspect and leads to the wrong result
in the MDL context. Part m examines the choice of law question
in the context of permanent transfers and concludes, as Korean Air
Lines did, that transferee federal law should apply. Part IV examines the question in the MDL context and concludes, contrary to
Korean Air Lines, that transferor federal law should apply.

m.

CHorCE

oF FEDERAL LAw

AFrnR PERMANENT

TRANsFERs

As discussed in Part I, Van Dusen rests on two sets of rationales:
the desire to preserve the plaintiff's venue and choice of law privileges and the desire to be faithful to Erie. The attempt to dismiss
Van Dusen as based exclusively on Erie concerns is not profitable.
Van Dusen, as viewed through the lens of Ferens, expresses three
concerns that are potentially applicable to transfers in cases with
federal issues. Transfers should not (i) disturb preexisting choice of
law advantages accruing to the plaintiff, (ii) give the defendant an
incentive to seek transfer for the purpose of obtaining more
favorable law, or (iii) introduce choice of law considerations into
transfer decisions.194
Nevertheless, this Part argues in accordance with the prevailing
view that the theoretical uniformity of federal law requires the application of transferee federal law in the permanent transfer context. This Part compares the role that choice of law principles play
in the state and federal systems. In the state system, choice of law
plays a significant role. There is, however, no analogous federal
concept because federal law is theoretically uniform. On federal
issues, the venue of appeal determines choice of law by default.
This result serves substantial efficiency interests. Because there is
no reason to distinguish transferred cases from other cases, transferee federal law should apply after permanent transfers. Van Dusen and Ferens do not require a contrary result.
should normally apply). Indeed, United Mine Workers was decided by a district court that
was required to follow Korean Air Lines.
192. See In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546, 1547
& n.1 (J.P.ML. 1988) (noting that "[w]hen determining whether to transfer an action under
Section 1407 ..• it is not the business of the Panel to consider what law the transferee court
might apply" and that "[a]ny suggestion to the contrary in [Plumbing Fixtures] is withdrawn"
(citation omitted)).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
194. See supra text accompanying note 109; Fmi, supra note 25, at 63-79 (arguing that the
policies articulated in Van Dusen and Ferens are equally applicable in the federal issue
context).
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A. Choice of State Law
When a plaintiff selects a state forum in a state law case, the
plaintiff's choice of venue influences but is not determinative of
choice of law. Rules of personal jurisdiction and venue limit the
available fora. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows states
to dismiss cases that are otherwise brought in legitimate fora.19s
Even when the plaintiff's choice of forum is the place of trial, the
forum does not necessarily apply its own law to the substance of the
controversy. One of the forum's first actions will be to apply choice
of law rules that identify the applicable substantive law.196
Conflicts principles in the early twentieth century were based on
the vested rights theory and made choice of law dependent on the
location of one legally relevant event.197 In tort, the First Conflicts
Restatement applied the law of the place where the injury occurred.198 In contract, the First Restatement applied the law of the
place of contracting to resolve contract validity questions199 and the
law of the place of performance to resolve questions regarding
breach.200 The First Restatement's chief virtue was predictability.
Its chief drawback was the inability to make individualized determinations in particular cases.
Modem choice of law theory has departed from vested rights
theory and the single-factor analyses of the First Restatement.
Modem choice of law is based on multifactor interest analyses that
focus on the interests of the parties and the relevant sovereigns in
having the laws of particular jurisdictions applied. Thus, the Second Conflicts Restatement supports application of the law of the
state with the most significant relationship to the litigation.201
Although the Second Restatement's approach allows for individualized choice of law determinations, it is inherently uncertain and unpredictable. In light of the mixed costs and benefits of both the
195. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
196. See EuoENE F. ScoLES & PETER HAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS §§ 3.1-.2 (2d ed. 1990);
cf. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990) ("To a large extent .•• state conflictsof-law rules ••• ensure that appropriate laws will apply to diversity cases.").
197. See ScoLES & HAY, supra note 196, § 17.2.
198. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST} OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934); Kyle Brackin, Salvaging the Wreckage: Multidistrict Litigation and Aviation, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 655, 673 n.81
(1992).
199. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 332 (1934).
200. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 358 (1934).
201. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws §§ 6, 145 (1969).
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Frrst and Second Restatement approaches, it should not be surprising that both have their adherents among the states.202
In sum, in the state court system, choice of law principles restrict
but do not eliminate the plaintiff's ability to choose the substantive
law applicable to the case. Because the forum usually applies its
own choice of law rules, the plaintiff has the ability to select a
choice of law rule, as well as a particular state's interpretation of
that rule, when choosing a venue.203 In cases with interstate elements that potentially identify more than one applicable law, this
system gives the plaintiff some advantage, but the advantage is not
absolute.
The plaintiff's biggest choice of law advantage in state law cases
is the ability to pick the procedural rules that will apply to the case.
Although state courts employ choice of law rules to identify the
applicable substantive law, they usually employ domestic law on
questions of procedure. The United States Constitution places
some limits, albeit not very restrictive ones, on a state's ability to
apply its own law to the substance of a controversy.2 04 There is,
however, no constitutional limit on a state's ability to apply its own
law to procedural questions.205 Most significantly, state courts usually apply their own law on limitations questions without regard to
which state's substantive law applies.206 It is, therefore, not surpris202. In 1983, Professor Herma Hill Kay surveyed the choice of law approaches of all fifty
states. See Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER
L. REv. 521, 591-92 (1983). Her conclusions are enlightening: Kentucky and Michigan apply
the forum law approach, see id. at 579-81; twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
follow the traditional approach of the First Restatement, see id. at 582-84; fourteen states
follow the Second Restatement's most significant relationship test, see id. at 552-62; New
York and North Dakota apply the center of gravity approach, see id. at 525-38; California and
New Jersey use the governmental interest approach, see id. at 538-52; Minnesota, New
Hampshire, and Wisconsin apply Lefiar's "better law" method, see id. at 562-72; and six
states combine a number of modem methods, see id. at 572-78. One Supreme Court Justice
described this choice of law landscape as "kaleidoscopic." See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494
U.S. 516, 538 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Under the doctrine of renvoi, the forum can choose to defer to the choice of law
rules of the jurisdiction that the forum's choice of law rules initially identified. See SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 196, § 3.13. American courts, however, employ renvoi only in limited circumstances. Id. at 67 & n.2.
204. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (holding that for a
state to apply its own substantive law it must have a " 'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts'" to the litigation (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313
(1981) (plurality opinion))).
205. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722-29 (1988). For a thoughtful critique
of Sun Oi~ see Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The Limitations Debate, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REv. 683, 712-23 (arguing that interest analysis should apply to limitations questions).
206. See Sun Oi~ 486 U.S. at 722-29. Limitations questions are substantive for Erie purposes. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1949)
(holding that the tolling of a statute of limitations is substantive); Guaranty 'Ihlst Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 108-10 (1945) (holding that the length of a limitations period is substantive).
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ing that an inordinate number of transfer cases have involved limitations issues.201
Thus, choice of law in the state law context represents a carefully calibrated system that balances the plaintiff's privileges
against the rights of the defendant and the needs of the judicial
system. To the extent that a plaintiff has any residual leverage over
choice of law after application of the rules of jurisdiction and venue,
it is a fair inference that the system intends this leverage. The state
law regime consciously confers on the plaintiff what can fairly be
described as a qualified choice of law privilege. Because federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction seek to respect state sovereignty and to achieve uniformity of result between federal and state
courts in the same location, it is understandable that federal courts
apply the choice of law rules of the local state courts and protect
the plaintiff's choice of law privilege.2os

B. Choice of Federal Law
The process by which federal district courts determine which circuit's law to apply is entirely different. For illustrative purposes, let
us return to the hypothetical posed at the outset of this article.209
Suppose a plaintiff files a claim pursuant to section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act in a federal court in New York and the
case is never transferred. In determining the degree of fault necessary to establish li~bility, the district court does not ask where the
injury occurred or which circuit has the most significant relationship
to the litigation. Indeed, the district court does not apply any
choice of law rule. The district court applies the Second Circuit's
precedents because the Second Circuit is the court that will hear
any appeal of the case.210
Traditionally, however, the states have treated these questions as procedural. See Sun Oil,
486 U.S. at 722-29; see also Duke v. Touche Ross & Co. 765 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991}
(applying transferee law to a federal limitations issue because the issue was one of procedure). In an attempt to prevent litigants from choosing a local forum with no relation to the
litigation to take advantage of the forum's limitations law, some states have adopted borrowing statutes, which preclude claims that are barred under the law of the jurisdiction that
governs the substance of the controversy. See ScoLES & HAY, supra note 196, § 3.11.
207. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519-21 (1990); see generally Currie,
Change of Venue, supra note 3, at 470-82 (discussing the effect of transfer on applicable state
limitations law); supra notes 149, 191.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
210. See, e.g., Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1981) {holding that a
district court is required to obey the circuit court that reviews its decisions), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 828 {1982); United States v. Barrientos, 485 F. Supp. 789, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1980) {"I
follow [the law of the Third Circuit] ..• not because I subscribe to it but because, sitting in
Philadelphia, I am required to do so, just as a district judge sitting in Miami must follow the
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In the absence of controlling Supreme Court authority, a federal
district court applies its best view of federal law in light of its circuit's precedents. On federal issues, the venue of appeal determines choice of law by default. This default rule obtains because
federal law is the creation of a single sovereign and is, therefore,
uniform in theory.211 Asking a choice of law question with respect
to federal issues is a logical nonsequitur.
The uniformity of federal law is, of course, a myth.212 As Professor Marcus's competence principle suggests, the thirteen federal
courts of appeals are not required to defer to each other.213 Until
the Supreme Court intervenes, each circuit court remains free to
apply its best view of federal law. Although the Supreme Court
exists in part to resolve differences among the circuits,214 the
Supreme Court is able to hear only a tiny fraction of the cases in
which certiorari is sought.215 The Supreme Court cannot guarantee
the uniformity of federal law on any but the most significant federal

Fifth Circuit ••.•"); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the
7Wo Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 258 n.170 (1985) (arguing that
"[c]urrent rules of precedent" are governed "by the mechanisms of review that Congress
provides for"); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L REv. 817, 824-25 (1994) (noting that in the federal system "[a] court must
follow the precedents established by the court(s) directly above it" but may "ignore precedents established by other courts so long as they lack revisory jurisdiction over it").
211. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 726-27 (1989).
212. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 17, at 686 (noting that the federal "system is not ideal;
historical development and current necessity make conflicts among the circuits inevitable");
id. at 691 (collecting cases that demonstrate circuit conflicts in securities cases); Burt
Neubome, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 Tm.. L. REv. 991, 997 (1987)
(calling the uniformity theory "hopelessly naive"). But see Seidelson, supra note 36, at 89
(arguing that disparities in federal law are temporary).
213. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 702; supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text; see
also, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REY. 1111, 1155 (1990). The current structure of the federal court system
derives from the Evarts Act of 1891, which established the modem courts of appeals. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
214. See SUP. Cr. R. 10.l(a) (citing the existence of a circuit conflict as a ground for
granting certiorari); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME CouRT PRACTICE 168-73 (7th ed.
1993).
215. See The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L REv. 144, 376
(1993) (showing that during the 1992 Term the Supreme Court disposed of 119 cases by
written opinion and 107 cases by memorandum decision out of the 6336 cases in which review
was sought).
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questions.216 Even where the Supreme Court is able to resolve intercircuit conflicts, the delay is often substantial.217
Attempts to unify federal law without the intervention of the
Supreme Court have also been unavailing. The drive to establish a
new federal appeals court to resolve differences among the circuits218 has been unsuccessful.219 It has been suggested, by analogy
to intracircuit practice, that every federal appeals court should defer to the first appeals court that decides any question.220 However,
no circuit currently holds the view that precedents of other circuits
should be treated as binding authority.221 The federal circuits have
adopted this position because the benefits of intercircuit dialogue
are thought to outweigh the costs of fragmentation of federal law
216. See Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that certiorari should be granted in a case that presents a circuit conflict, and noting that SS
other conflicts among the state and federal courts were not resolved by the Court during the
1989 Term); Byron R White, A Salute to the Circuits, 28 l.oY. L. REv. 669, 670 (1982) ("[T]he
courts of appeals these days are in large part - and necessarily so - finally responsible for
the interpretation and enforcement, and hence for the condition, of the federal law."); see
also Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 l:IARv. L. REv. S42, S80 (1969) ("The 'law of
the circuit' has emerged as a response to the Supreme Court's incapacity to resolve intracircuit conflicts."). But see GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF
nm SuPREME CoURT 89-90 (1976) (arguing that the Supreme Court is able to resolve all but
a small percentage of genuine circuit conflicts).
217. See Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE LJ. 801, 811 (1990);
Marcus, supra note 17, at 688 & n.74.
218. See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, S9 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681, 684-96, 813-22 (1984);
Marcus, supra note 17, at 689 n.82 (describing bills that would have created a temporary
Intercircuit Tribunal of the U.S. Courts of Appeals); Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary
- Inflation, Malfunction, and a Proposed Course ofAction, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 617, 625-37
(discussing various proposals for a national court of appeals); Sanford Canst-Ellenbogen,
Note, Using Choice of Law Rules to Make Intercircuit Conflicts Tolerable, S9 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1078, 1085-86 (1984).
219. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 163, at 6 (noting that Congress, in enacting the Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, rejected the recommendation of the Hruska Commission to create a new appellate court to handle cases referred by the Supreme Court).
220. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Some thoughts on the Supreme Court's workload, 66
JUDICATURE 230, 232, 23S (1983) (noting that Justice White has endorsed this proposal);
Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 455 (1983); CaustEllenbogen, supra note 218, at 1090; Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposal
for National Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE LJ. 1219, 1240-46 .(1978).
221. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 736 & n:275. I do not mean to suggest
that the federal circuits disregard the decisions of their sister circuits. The creation of an
intercircuit conflict is a factor suggesting the need for en bane review. See, e.g., Douglas H.
Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, S9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1008,
1024-25 (1991) (describing the D.C. Circuit's practice and noting that this rule obtains in part
because "fa] conflict between circuits is an embarrassment to a system of national law"); see
also Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE LJ. 831, 834 & n.18 (1990) (collecting cases in which circuit
courts recognized an obligation to accommodate the law of other circuits in the interests of
national uniformity).
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among the circuits.222 Permitting the courts of appeals to depart
from the rulings of other circuits allows the law to develop.223 If
courts of appeals continue to disagree over time, this fact signals the
Supreme Court that an issue is ripe for review and aids the
Supreme Court in resolving the issue.224 As a consequence, federal
law is uniform within but not among circuits.225
The absence of federal choice of law rules demonstrates that the
federal courts are required to accept the myth of a uniform federal
law. To return to our hypothetical, a district court in New York will
apply the law of the Second Circuit in a federal securities case even
if all the parties reside in Ohio and all relevant events occurred in
Ohio. By any choice of law criteria, this result is absurd. However,
the district court is not permitted to undertake a choice of law analysis. Even though federal law is not uniform in practice, the district
court is required to pretend that it is.226
To summarize, a federal district court in New York applies the
law of the Second Circuit for only one reason: any appeal \vill lie to
the Second Circuit. Although district judges have occasionally ignored binding appellate precedent227 and recent commentators
have questioned the duty of district courts to apply the law of reviewing appellate courts,228 there is hardly a more well-accepted
222. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 736. But see Schaefer, supra note 220, at
454.
223. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 736-37.
224. See id.
225. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 210, at 855; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at
805.
226. See In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1065 n.19
(3d Cir. 1976) ("[F]ederal law .•• is assumed to be nationally uniform, whether or not it is in
fact."); United States v. Barrientos, 485 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (arguing that" 'a
conflict of law between the Circuits' is a misnomer" even when a "conflict of interpretations"
exists).
227. One Alabama district judge has refused to follow the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128
(S.D. Ala.), modified sub nom Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 926 (1984), affd., 472 U.S. 38 (1985). District Judge William Cox was often unwilling
to follow Fifth Circuit precedent in voting rights cases. See FRANK T. READ & LuCY S.
McGouGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP Saum 293303 (1978). State courts have occasionally refused to follow Supreme Court rulings. See
State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975) (refusing to accept the incorporation doctrine
as applied to the First Amendment), overruled by State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n.4 (Utah
1983).
228. See Paul L. Colby, 7Wo Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial
Opinions, 61 Tm_ L. REv. 1041, 1058 (1987) (noting that the duty of lower courts to follow
the precedents of higher courts is "not compulsory but suasive"); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J .L.
& REuGION 33, 85 (1989); see also Caminker, supra note 210, at 856-65 (exploring the question but concluding, after a review of the relevant literature, that district courts generally
apply the law of reviewing appellate courts).
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procedural rule. A trial court's duty to follow the precedents of a
court with appellate jurisdiction flows from substantial efficiency
concems.229 This practice saves resources at both the trial and appellate levels.230 The district court does not have to reconsider any
questions decided by the appellate court. Following precedent obviates the need for appeals. It also allows the parties to obtain the
result that the appellate court would require at the earliest possible
time.23 1 A contrary rule would have a substantial differential impact on poor parties.232 Whereas rich parties would have the ability
to get errant district court decisions reversed, poorer parties might
lack the financial resources for an appeal they know they could win.
The rule that the venue of appeal determines the applicable federal law obtains in fora other than the district courts. The United
States Tax Court hears cases in which a taxpayer wishes to challenge a .ruling of the Internal Revenue Service prior to paying the
tax.233 An appeal from the Tax Court lies to the court of appeals
where the taxpayer resides.234 For many years, the Tax Court took
the position that, unlike the district courts, it had a nationwide mandate to apply the tax laws uniformly and was, therefore, not required to defer to the precedents of any court of appeals.235 This
229. For an argument that the duty to follow Supreme Court precedent flows directly
from the requirements of Article III, see Caminker, supra note 210, at 828-34. See also id. at
838-39 (rejecting the argument that the duty to follow the precedents of courts with appellate
jurisdiction flows directly from the statutes creating such jurisdiction). Although Caminker
questions the strength of a number of rationales, he ultimately concludes that courts should
follow the precedents of courts with appellate jurisdiction in most cases. See id. at 839-43,
865-67.
230. See id. at 839-40.
231. See id. at 843-45. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989), the Supreme Court noted that the inferior federal courts must follow existing Supreme Court precedent even when they believe that the Supreme Court would overrule such precedent. See 490 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court issued this rebuke in Shearson
even as it overruleq a prior case, as the Fifth Circuit had predicted it would. See 490 U.S. at
479-84. Shearson should not be taken as a contradiction of the policy that trial courts should
strive to mirror the results that are most likely to prevail on appeal. The Shearson Court may
simply have believed that the costs of inaccurate predictions that prior precedents would be
overruled outweighed the benefits of accurate predictions. Because the Supreme Court usually declines to overrule its prior cases, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2808-16 (1992) (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis), the safer practice is to require
obedience to all higher authority until such time as it is the ple115ure of the superior court to
reconsider.
232. Cf. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at 812 (discussing this principle in the context of agency nonacquiescence); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 749-50 (same).
233. See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (1988). A taxpayer who is willing to pay any required tax
prior to filing suit may seek a refund in either district court or the U.S. Claims Court. $ee 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (1988).
234. See 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(l)(A) (1988).
235. See Lawrence v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713, 716-17 (1957), revd., 258 F.2d 562 (9th
Cir. 1958).
.
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position was sharply criticized by the circuit courts.236 In Go/sen v.
Commissioner, 237 the Tax Court changed course and agreed to follow the precedents of the circuit court with appellate jurisdiction.23s
It did so for the same efficiency reasons that district courts obey
circuit courts with appellate jurisdiction.239
The rule that the venue of appeal determines applicable federal
law also obtains in the administrative agency context. Many agencies have national jurisdiction to administer legislative schemes that
includes a quasi-judicial function. Congress often provides for judicial review of such determinations. In some circumstances the
venue of judicial appeal is definite, and in others it is not.240 When
the venue of appeal is definite, the comnion agency practice is to
apply the law of the appellate forum.241
Prior to 1985, the Social Security Administration (SSA) refused
in its adjudicatory proceedings to apply the law of the judicial forum with appellate jurisdiction. Claimants who are denied social
security benefits have the right to appeal to the federal district
court where they reside.242 Nevertheless, the SSA took the view
that it was not bound by the precedents of the federal circuit in
which the claimant resided and that as the administrator of a na236. See, e.g., Stacey Mfg. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956) ("[T]he Tax
Court of the United States is not lawfully privileged to disregard and refuse to follow ••• the
settled law of [this] circuit •••.").
237. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd., 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
238. See Go/sen, 54 T.C. at 757. The Tax Court may still have greater leeway than a
district court to depart from the precedents of the circuit court with appellate jurisdiction.
The Tax Court is only required to follow relevant circuit decisions that are squarely on point.
See Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 989 (2d Cir. 1973); Go/sen, 54 T.C. at
757. In Lardas v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 490 (1992), the Tax Court recently took a very
narrow view of when circuit precedents are squarely on point. Lardas, 99 T.C. at 494-95. For
a critique of the Lardas case and its implications for forum shopping, see Donald B. Tobin,
Note, The Tax Court Revisits the Golsen Rule: Lardas v. Commissioner, 47 TAX LAW. 559
(1994).
239. See Go/sen, 54 T.C. at 757 (adopting the new rule in the interest of "efficient and
harmonious judicial admfuistration").
240. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 687.
241. See In re Anselmo, Interim Decision 3105 (Bureau of Immigration Appeals May 11,
1989), reprinted in 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 598 (1989) (rejecting the nonacquiescence
policy in deportation proceedings); Davis Metal Stamping, Inc., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1259,
1261 (Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Commn. Apr. 15, 1985) (applying the law of the
circuit to which the party said it would appeal), affd., 800 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986); Diller &
Morawetz, supra note 217, at 801 n.1 (noting that most agencies "that are certain which circuit will review their decisions generally practice intracircuit acquiescence"); Estreicher &
Revesz, supra note 211, at 716 (noting that when review of agency action is vested in a single
court of appeals, most agencies will apply the law of that court).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). A claimant may also appeal in the district in which its
principal place of business is located. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). The overwhelming majority of cases, however, are appealed in the district of the claimant's residence. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 694.
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tional scheme, it was entitled to apply its best view of federal law in
light of Supreme Court authority.243
The SSA's position - that it would not defer to the precedents
of the judicial fora to which its cases would be appealed - is usually referred to as nonacquiescence.244 The SSA's policy caused a
national uproar. It was condemned by the courts245 and commentators.246 Two United States Attorneys refused to represent the Government in SSA nonacquiescence cases. The strength of the
reaction to the nonacquiescence view demonstrates the substantial
importance of the efficiency concerns that require adherence to the
precedents of a court with appellate jurisdiction.247 The SSA, unlike the federal district courts and .the Tax Court, is not part of the
243. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 694-97. Since 1985, the SSA has softened its nonacquiescence policy. See id. at 697-99.
244. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at 801. The Internal Revenue Service, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Federal Trade Commission, and Merit Systems Protection
Board also have policies that pennit a certain amount of nonacquiescence. See Estreicher &
Revesz, supra note 211, at 713-14, 718. To be distinguished from the policies of these agencies is that of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which supervises a scheme in
which the venue of judicial appeal is uncertain. See id. at 709. In this circumstance, although
it has also been criticized by the courts, see id. at 710-12, the NLRB would seem justified in
refusing to apply the precedents of the inferior federal courts. See Diller & Morawetz, supra
note 217, at 802 n.8; Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 735-43. Congress would do well,
however, to change the statutory scheme to provide for a definite appellate venue so that the
agency could know where judicial appeals would lie and apply the rules of that circuit. See id.
at 764-70.
245. See Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the SSA represented that it was currently following Second Circuit law and enjoining the SSA to follow
Second Circuit law with respect to claimants residing in the Second Circuit on that basis);
Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.) (affirming a preliminary injunction against the
SSA's nonacquiescence policy), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082
(1984); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting a preliminary
injunction against the SSA's nonacquiescence policy), vacated sub nom Stieberger v. Bowen,
801F.2d29 (2d Cir.1986) (vacating the injunction based on Schisler); Thomas v. Heckler, 598
F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (enjoining the SSA's nonacquiescence policy); Holden v.
Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (same); see also Diller & Morawetz, supra note
217, at 801 n.2 (collecting cases condemning agency nonacquiescence). In Hyatt v. Heckler,
579 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.C. 1984), the district court's injunction against the SSA's nonacquiescence policy was vacated by the court of appeals, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985), whose judgment was in tum vacated by the Supreme Court, Hyatt v. Bowen, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986).
Although the Fourth Circuit did not reinstate the injunction on remand, it strongly disapproved of the SSA's nonacquiescence policy. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
246. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217; Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at 681
n.8 (collecting authorities). Even those commentators who oppose a per se ban on agency
nonacquiescence suggest that agencies may refuse to follow the precedeJ!ts of judicial fora
with appellate jurisdiction only in very limited circumstances. See id. at 683, 743-53 (arguing
that an agency may engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence only when it has a reasonable
prospect of obtaining a change in the law).
247. See Diller & Morawetz, supra note 217, at 812-17. Constitutional arguments have
also been advanced to support the same result. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 211, at
718-35 (collecting constitutional arguments and arguing that such concerns do not justify a
per se ban on agency nonacquiescence).
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federal judicial system.248 Arguably, the SSA, as the administrator
of a national program, has a much greater procedural and substantive interest in the uniformity of the federal law it administers than
the federal district courts.249 Perhaps the SSA should have been
permitted to apply whatever scheme comported with its best view
of federal law, subject only to the perils of being reversed in a court
that Congress endowed with appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the SSA's nonacquiescence program elicited strong passions and
has been widely viewed as beyond the pale.
The rule that the venue of appeal determines applicable federal
law also obtains within the state court system.25o State courts are
often required to determine federal questions. They usually have
concurrent jurisdiction over federal question cases,251 some of
which are not removable.252 Absent diversity of citizenship, state
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over federal issues in
cases in which the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises only
state law questions.253 When a state court decides federal issues, it
owes no fealty to the inferior federal courts in its region, including
the local court of appeals.254 State trial courts owe obedience on
federal issues only to the higher state courts and the Supreme Court
of the United States. This result obtains because the inferior federal courts do not lie in the path of appellate review.255
248. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 221, at 839-40 (rejecting the "analogy between
administrative agencies and district courts").
249. See id. at 840.
250. See Caminker, supra note 210, at 825.
251. There is a strong presumption in favor of such state court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981); Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962).
252. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988) (denying the removal of Securities Act claims); 28
U.S.C. § 1445 (1988) (denying the removal of certain labor cases).
253. The federal district courts do not have original jurisdiction over cases where federal
issues are introduced only by way of defense. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. l, 9-12 (1983); Gully v. First Natl. Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113
(1936); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908).
254. See, e.g., Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1992); Bromley v. Crisp, 561
F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971);
Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965); Alicia T. v. County of L.A., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 513, 517 (a. App. 1990); Bradshaw v. State, 286 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 919 (1974); State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 402-04 (N.J. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950
(1966); Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993).
255. In criminal matters, Congress has provided for habeas corpus review of federal issues in the inferior federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). As a consequence, in this
context it makes eminent good sense for the state courts to follow the local federal court of
appeals. See Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1965). One court recently
suggested that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to follow the precedents of the
federal court of appeals with habeas review power. See Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571,
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In sum, the venue of appeal determines choice of law on federal
issues. Although Marcus's competence principle is an element of
the analysis, it provides only a partial explanation for the result.
The core idea is that in the absence of federal choice of law rules,
efficiency concerns require the application of the law of the court
with appellate jurisdiction. I call this view the "appellate model."
As demonstrated below, the appellate model confirms the wellaccepted view that transferee federal law should apply after permanent transfers. As Part IV demonstrates, however, the appellate
model requires a different result in the context of MDL transfers.
C.

The Effect of Permanent Transfer

Now suppose, in accordance with our hypothetical, that a federal court in New York decides, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to
transfer a case brought under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to a federal court in Ohio. Should the transferee court
apply the law of the Second Circuit, which allows the plaintiff to
prevail on a showing of negligence, or the Sixth Circuit, which requires proof of scienter?
The law of the Sixth Circuit should apply, and the district court
should hold that proof of scienter is required. If the complaint alleges only negligence, the district court should dismiss the complaint.256 The determining factor in choice of federal law is the site
of appellate jurisdiction. Because any appeal will be heard by the
Sixth Circuit, the district court in Ohio should apply the Sixth Circuit's view of federal law, just as it would for cases originally commenced in its court.257 Allowing the plaintiff to proceed on a
negligence theory would potentially waste substantial resources.
Because the Sixth Circuit is not required to follow the Second, applying the Second Circuit's view on this question would invite certain reversal if the plaintiff wins.2Ss
577 (8th Cir. 1991), revd. on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). This assertion, however,
seems questionable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 846 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
256. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 & n.S (1976) (requiring proof of
scienter in connection with Rule lOb-5 claims and affirming the dismissal of a complaint
alleging only negligence).
257. See Greyhound Fm. Corp. v. Willyard, No. 87-C-0911B, 1989 WL 201094, at *14 (D.
Utah Dec. 26, 1989) (applying transferee federal law after a permanent transfer because the
transferee court of appeals would be the appellate forum); Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v.
First Natl. Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 393-94 (D. Del. 1986) (applying transferee federal law
after a permanent transfer to avoid the anomaly of the transferee circuit having to disregard
its established precedents).
258. See Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 641-48 (1987) (arguing
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The concerns of Van Dusen and Ferens do not require a different result. By contrast to the state law contex~. the plaintiff has no
choice of law privilege with respect to federal law. Unlike the state
system, the plaintiff's residual ability to influence applicable federal
law is not the result of a carefully calibrated system. The plaintiff's
choice of venue usually determines choice of law by default, not
because the plaintiff has any entitlement to this result. The plaintiff
had access to the Second Circuit's law only because of the broad
venue provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.259 However,
Congress also created section 1404(a) as a limitation on these venue
provisions. As a consequence, the plaintiff has no legitimate cause
for complaint if transfer changes applicable federal law.
The rule that transferee federal law should apply does not violate the concern of Van Dusen and Ferens that transfer decisions
should be determined by efficiency rather than choice of law considerations. Because the uniformity of federal law is accepted as a
given, applicable federal law is deemed to remain unchanged after
transfer. As a consequence, any detriment to the plaintiff receives
no weight in the transfer calculus because, by hypothesis, no detriment exists.26°
Nor is this result unfair. The absence of choice of law rules with
respect to federal issues gives the plaintiff a significant litigation advantage. The plaintiff is often presented with a wide range of venue
options, and the plaintiff's initial choice of forum is entitled to respect. The defendant has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of venue.2 61 Because the
plaintiff is the first actor in the venue process, the plaintiff has a
greater ability than the defendant to influence venue and, as a consequence, choice of law.262 Any detriment to plaintiffs in transferred cases would seem at least offset by the plaintiff's ability to
choose the applicable federal law in cases that are not transferred.
that transferee federal law should apply to prevent reversal in the transferee court of ap·
peals}. We might, of course, depart from the principle of competence and require the Sixth
Circuit to apply the Second Circuit's law on the standard of fault required in § 14(a) actions.
This rule, however, would have all the costs that a similar rule would have in the MDL
context and none of the compensating benefits. See infra section IV.C. Unlike in the MDL
context, the Second Circuit would have no ability to review the case to determine if the
courts in the Sixth Circuit applied its law correctly. See infra text accompanying note 340.
259. See supra note 9.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 136-45.
261. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
262. Thus, although Marcus argued that venue established choice of law by default in
diversity cases, see supra text accompanying notes 162-68, venue actually plays a greater role
in establishing choice of law with respect to federal issues.
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The last of the Van Dusen-Ferens concerns presents a greater
obstacle to the application of transferee federal law. Applying
transferee federal law presents defendants with the prospect of obtaining a better law in some cases as a result of transfer. As a consequence, defendants will have an incentive to ·seek transfer for
reasons not related to trial efficiencies.263 Although the trial court
has the power to deny transfer motions that are not founded on
efficiency considerations, the system wastes resources in disposing
of transfer motions that originate from choice of law concerns.
Nevertheless, the fundamental assumptions of the federal system require the application of transferee federal law. There is no
choice of law with respect to federal law because federal law is theoretically uniform. Although this result does not obtain in practice,
the lack of practical uniformity is a fact that federal courts are not
permitted to consider. Were they allowed to admit the existence of
variations in federal law, the creation of federal choice of law rules
would be a necessity. Just as the theoretical uniformity of federal
law outweighs choice of law considerations, it outweighs any efficiency concern related to forum shopping by defendants.
Perhaps the better practice would be to recognize the lack of
uniformity of federal law with all its attendant implications. Federal courts might then create choice of law rules to determine applicable circuit law.2 64 The plaintiff might receive a choice of law
privilege that courts should protect in the transfer process, and federal choice of law rules might discourage defendants from forum
shopping. Until the fundamental assumptions of the system
change, however, courts should treat transfers in accordance with
the same assumptions that govern cases that are not transferred,
including the assumptions that a single federal law governs all federal issues and that the venue of appeal determines which circuit's
law applies in district court. It is not so much that Van Dusen's
policies are inapplicable in the federal issue context as that the federal courts are disabled from considering them.
263. See Friendly, supra note 149, at 412 (noting that the application of transferee federal
law encourages forum shopping by defendants). Although forum shopping usually has pejorative overtones, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L.
REv. 11, 14, we should not forget that an attorney's job is to give the client the greatest
possible chance of winning, which includes selecting the forum that will apply the best law
from the client's perspective. See Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd. on other grounds, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980); Purcell, supra note 35, at 449-51.
264. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 218, at 1091-98 (arguing for the application of
choice of federal law rules based on the defendant's residence or principal place of business).
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D. Conclusion
In sum, as Clayton and Green suggest, transferee federal law
should apply in the permanent transfer context as a consequence of
the theoretical uniformity of federal law and the allocation of appellate jurisdiction within the federal court system.26S The progeny
of Clayton and Green were correct to discount the significance of
Van Dusen. The next Part examines the choice of law question in
the MDL ·context and concludes that the special circumstances of
MDL litigation require a different result.

IV.

CHOICE OF FEDERAL

LAW

AFrER

MDL TRANSFERS

This Part considers the choice of law question in the context.of

MDL transfers and concludes, contrary to the emerging consensus
view, that MDL courts should apply the law of the transferor circuit
on federal questions. This result flows from the structure and purposes of the MDL Act. The MDL Act contemplates a remand to
the transferor court after the conclusion of pretrial proceedings. As
a consequence, the transferor circuit is the ultimate appellate forum, and its law should apply during all phases of the case. Moreover, although there is little direct legislative history, the limited
purposes of MDL transfers suggest that Congress did not desire
MDL transfers to have outcome-determinative effects.

A. The MDL Context
1. Applying the Appellate Model

The MDL Act allows the JPML to consolidate cases involving
common questions of fact for pretrial purposes. The MDL venue
need not be one in which the actions could have been brought as an
original matter. The MDL court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
transferred cases during the pretrial phase.266 At the conclusion of
pretrial proceedings, pending cases are remanded to their original
265. Because a pennanent transfer has the effect of changing the federal law applicable
to the case, district courts should make transfer decisions as early in the proceedings as prac·
ticable. See 1B JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrICE 'I 0.404[4.·2] {2d
ed. 1994).
266. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122 (1989); Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 87 (5th Cir.
1985); Eckstein v. Balcor Ftlm Investors, 740 F. Supp. 572, 574-75 (E.D. Wis. 1990). Because
the MDL Act evinces Congress's desire for coordinated pretrial proceedings in the MDL
court, the MDL judge has the power to rescind previous rulings made by the transferor district judge. See, e.g., Astarte, 161 F.2d at 87; In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab.
Lltig., 664 F.2d 114, 118-20 {6th Cir. 1981).
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fora for trial. 267 After remand, any appeal from the final judgment
lies in the circuit in which the trial court is located.
Because the MDL Act contemplates that cases will be remanded to their original fora for trial and appeal, the MDL judge
should apply transferor circuit law to all federal issues because the
transferor circuit will have ultimate jurisdiction over any appeal of
the case.268 This result is consistent with the rule that, due to the
absence of federal choice of law principles, the venue of appeal determines applicable circuit law. The application of transferor federal law in MDL cases is justified by the same efficiency
considerations that require district courts to apply the precedents of
their own circuits in cases that are not transferred and in cases that
are permanently transferred under section 1404(a). Were an MDL
court in Ohio to hold, in accordance with the Sixth Circuit's law,
that section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act requires proof of
scienter, the Second Circuit would overturn this result on ultimate
appeal. As a consequence, after remand the federal district court in
New York would probably vacate the MDL judge's ruling to save
the Second Circuit the trouble and allow the trial to proceed in accordance with Second Circuit law.269
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) {1988).
268. Although there have been suggestions that one circuit court may not examine rulings made by a district court in another circuit, see Steinman, supra note 258, at 644 n.159
(collecting cases), it would seem that, because all interlocutory rulings may be reconsidered
prior to final judgment, see FEo. R. CIV. P. 54(b), the district court that enters final judgment
in any case is deemed to endorse any previous rulings made in the case and the court of
appeals that supervises the district court entering judgment is entitled to revise any errors on
which the judgment rests. See Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Intl., Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1138
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the transferee court of appeals has jurisdiction to review pretransfer rulings by a district court in another circuit that were not reconsidered by the transferee district court. after transfer); Steinman, supra note 258, at 646-47. As a consequence,
after the remand of an MDL case, jurisdiction is exclusively in the remand court, final judgment will be entered by the remand court, and the court of appeals that supervises the remand court is entitled to inquire into all aspects of the case. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v.
LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341, 1345 (7th Cir.) (noting that errors made by the MDL judge "will be
subject to review .•• at the time of the entry of judgment on the complaints in the suits in the
ultimate trial forum" and that "[t]he transferor court .•. takes the case with all of its errors, if
any, that may have fastened on the carcase theretofore"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971).
269. Departing from earlier decisions to avoid appellate reversal is a well-accepted exception to the law of the case doctrine. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 704 (7th
Cir. 1985); Loumar, Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 763 {5th Cir. 1983); Holzsager v. Valley
Hosp., 482 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (refusing to accept the rulings of a transferor
court in another circuit on a subject matter jurisdiction question because the law of the case
doctrine "should not prevent the discharge of a judge's obligation to present an appellate
court with the judgment he believes ought to be rendered in the case" (quoting Rodriguez v.
Olaf Pedersen's Rederi AJS, 387 F. Supp. 754, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd., 527 F.2d 1282 (2d
Cir. 1975))); 1B MooRE ET AL, supra note 265, 'I 0.404[4.-2] (arguing that district courts
should be hesitant to effect permanent transfers after substantial proceedings have occurred
because of the potential for reexamination in the transferee court); Steinman, supra note 258,
at 641-43 (arguing that a district court should reexamine federal decisions made by a district
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2. Congressional Intent
The application of transferor federal law in MDL cases is also
consistent with the will of Congress.210 The MDL Act was passed
in 1968271 in response to the thousands of electrical equipment
price-fixing cases filed in the early 1960s under the federal antitrust
laws. In these cases discovery proceedings were coordinated by the
judiciary under a special procedure developed to avoid duplication
of effort in the various federal districts involved.212 Sparse legislative history suggests that Congress gave little consideration to the
choice of law problem but may have assumed that transferor law
woUld apply.273 Professor Marcus has argued that this history is irrelevant in the federal issue context because the authors of these
comments had diversity cases, the actual context in which Van Dusen was decided, in mind.274 As a more recent view contends, however, Congress passed the MDL Act with federal antitrust cases in
mind, so there is no reason to believe that it assumed that transferor law would apply only to diversity cases.21s
Moreover, the actual legislation passed by Congress provides insight into Congress's position on choice of law. The MDL scheme
approved by Congress is quite limited. The MDL court has jurisdiction only over pretrial proceedings. Any subsequent proceedings must be conducted in the transferor court after remand.
Because of the limited scope of MDL proceedings, Congress allowed MDL transfers to courts that would not have been legitimate
original fora and, therefore, would not qualify as permanent transcourt in another circuit to prevent reversal on appeal); id. at 704-05 (applying this principle
after remand in MDL proceedings).
270. By contrast, there is no indication that Congress directly considered this issue in
1948 when it enacted § 1404(a).
271. See Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)).
272. See Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 623-24 (1964); Lawrence J. Fleming, Note, The
Problem of Venue in Multiple District Litigation, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 507, 518-19 (1966);
see also Brackin, supra note 198, at 664; Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 581 (1978).
273. In connection with the hearings on the MDL Act, two witnesses with experience in
the handling of the electrical equipment price-fixing cases testified that the Van Dusen rule
would apply in MDL cases. See Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966) (testimony of Dean Phil Neal); id. at 25 (testimony of Judge William
Becker).
-274. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 710-11.
275. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1157-58.

February 1995]

The Appellate Model

749

feree courts.276 Congress explicitly considered and rejected the
possibility of consolidating MDL cases for trial.211 It is hard to
imagine that Congress contemplated that pretrial transfers to fora
that lacked the ability to conduct trials would have outcomedeterminative effects.21s
To be contrasted with the scheme Congress enacted are MDL
schemes that give the MDL court greater powers. The Multiforum,
Multiparty Jurisdiction Act of 1989 (MMJ Act),279 which has never
become law, provides for permanent transfers to MDL fora to maximize the efficiencies inherent in consolidating mass tort cases.280
As part of this scheme, the MMJ Act provides that a single law
should apply to all state law issues and lists factors for courts to
consider in selecting the applicable law.281 Thus, in state law cases,
the MMJ Act would overrule Klaxon and provide the first federal
choice of law principles.282 Federal issues are exempted from the
276. Section 1404(a) permits a permanent transfer to any district "where [the case] might
have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
language to refer to fora that can exercise personal jurisdiction and venue without the defendant's consent See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
277. Congress declined to order permanent consolidation for four reasons: (i) the experience of the electrical equipment price-fixing cases, on which the MDL Act was based, had
been limited to coordinated pretrial proceedings; (ii) it might be impracticable to litigate all
MDL cases in a single district; (iii) a trial in the original district would probably be more
convenient for the parties and witnesses; and (iv) discovery proceedings in the original forum
might be needed to supplement the MDL proceedings. See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1901-02; George T. Conway III, Note,
The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE LJ. 1099, 1108 n.45
(1987).
278. See In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Colo.
1987) (noting that "[a]pplication of the federal law of the transferor forum is supported by
the very purpose of multidistrict litigation" because ''the ultimate aim of the transferee court
is to return each case to its transferor jurisdiction in a state of readiness for trial").
279. H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 135 CoNG. REc. 23,302 (1989). The
MMJ Act has been revised and reintroduced in each succeeding Congress. See Linda S.
Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REv. 977,
977 n.5 (1994) (collecting bills).
280. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 4, reprinted in 135 CoNG. REc. at 23,302; see also
John F. Cooney, Note, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Litigation
Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 588, 611 (1972) (arguing tliat Congress should amend the MDL Act
to allow for consolidated trials); Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 745-49 (1991) (arguing that
Congress should amend the MDL Act to give the JPML the power to consolidate cases for
trial).
281. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 6(a), reprinted in 135 CoNG. REc. at 23,303.
282. Courts and commentators have often expressed a preference for federal choice of
law rules in consolidated cases. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 403
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law
Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REv. LmG. 309 (1991). But
see Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. 1\verski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass
Tort Litigation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARa. L. REv. 76 (1989) (arguing in favor of the
Klaxon rule in mass tort cases).
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choice of law provisions,283 presumably because transferee federal
law would apply after the permanent transfers contemplated by the
Act without reference to any choice of law rules.284 This result
would be consistent with the weight of authority as well as sound
theory.
The American Law Institute's (ALI) Complex Litigation Project similarly recommends altering the current MDL procedure to
allow permanent consolidation of cases involving common questions of fact. 285 Like the MMJ Act, the ALI proposes federal
choice of law principles to govern state law issues.286 Unlike the
MMJ Act, the ALi's proposal directly addresses the problem of intercircuit conflicts on federal issues and adopts the position that
transferee circuit law should apply.287
Thus, broader MDL schemes allow for the permanent transfer
and consolidation of related cases.288 Such schemes also have sig283. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 6(a), reprinted in 135 CoNo. REc. at 23,303.
284. The MMJ Act still has the potential to create some choice of law difficulties on
federal issues. The MMJ Act consolidates cases in the MDL court for the purpose of ascertaining liability. At the conclusion of this phase of the case, the Act gives the MDL judge the
power to proceed to the damages phase of the case or to remand the cases to their original
fora for the ascertainment of damages. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 4, reprinted in 135
CoNo. REc. at 23,302. In state law cases, the Act provides that the law identified as applicable by the MDL judge pursuant to the Act's choice of law provisions will continue to apply
after remand. See H.R. 3406, supra note 279, § 6(c), reprinted in 135 CoNo. REc. at 23,303.
On federal issues, however, the MMJ Act creates a dilemma similar to that now faced in
MDL cases. After remand, should the original forum apply the law of its own circuit or the
MDL circuit in fixing damages? If the MMJ Act becomes law, the better approach would
seem to be to apply MDL circuit law after remand, because this circuit's law will apply on
liability questions and a single circuit's law should apply to all issues in MDL cases.
285. See CLP, supra note 149, § 3.06. The ALi's proposal includes the possibility that
cases originally filed in federal court could be transferred to state court, which would then be
the forum in which consolidated proceedings were ultimately conducted. See id. § 4.01; see
also Conway, supra note 277, at 1107-12 (proposing that Congress amend the MDL Act to
allow the consolidation of related cases for trial in state court and arguing that the transferee
state court should be free to apply its own law). This reverse removal procedure was recently
criticized in Joan Steinman, Reverse Remova~ 78 IowA L. REv. 1029 (1993).
286. See CLP, supra note 149, § 6.01. The Louisiana Law Review recently dedicated a
symposium issue to the Complex Litigation Project. Commentators supporting the ALi's
choice of law scheme were P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALi's Complex
Litigation Project: A Glass Half Full?, 54 LA. L REv. 953 (1994), and James A.R. Nafziger,
Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and the Common Law, 54
LA. L. REv. 1001 {1994). In opposition were Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation
Project's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 LA. L. REv. 907 {1994); Robert A. Sedler, The Com-

plex Litigation Project's Proposal for Federally-Mandated Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases:
Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L REv. 1085 (1994); and David E. Seidelson,
Section 6.01 of the ALi's Complex Litigation Project: Function Follows Form, 54 LA. L. REv.
1111 {1994).
287. See CLP, supra note 149, § 6.08.
288. In addition to the MDL schemes described in the text, there have been proposals to
exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction in aviation cases, see Brackin, supra note 198, at
702-09, and in cases in which any defendant has a residence in a state other than the one
where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, see
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nifi.cant choice of law implications. The MMJ Act and the ALI
both propose federal choice of law rules to identify applicable state
law to enhance the efficiency of the MDL procedures. The MMJ
Act implies, and the ALi's Complex Litigation Project states, that
transferee federal law would apply in consolidated cases. The application of transferee federal law in these schemes is a natural result of the allowance of permanent transfers.. Such transfers always
have the potential to change results with respect to federal issues,
and MDL cases should be no different. Unless and until Congress
sees fit to adopt a scheme providing for permanent MDL transfers,
however, the MDL Act should be seen as preserving the traditional
choice of law framework with as little impact as possible on the
results in transferred cases. The discomfort that MDL courts have
in applying the law of their own circuits is demonstrated by the fact
that such courts continue to give some respect, although less than
dispositive signifi.cance, to the law of the transferor circuit court.289
One might question the above analysis based on the substantive
powers given to MDL courts prior to remand. Some have argued
that the MDL court lacks the power to effect permanent transfers
pursuant to section 1404(a)290 or make substantive rulings because
the MDL Act was principally designed to allow consolidation of
discovery proceedings.291 The courts have soundly rejected this position.292 It is contrary to the language of the MDL Act, which
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 7, 23-28 (1986). The authors of these proposals do
not consider the effect of their plans on choice of federal law, but they advocate altering the
Klaxon rule with respect to state law litigation. See Brackin, supra note 198, at 707; Rowe &
Sibley, supra, at 37-41.
289. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (suggesting that the law rif the transferor circuit warrants "close consideration"), affd.
sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989); In re Donald J. Trump Casino
Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 548 (D.NJ. 1992), affd., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994); Isaac v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 749 F. Supp. 855, 863 (E.D.
Tenn. 1990).
290. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1159-64 (arguing that the language and legislative
history of§ 1407 preclude transfer decisions by the MDL court); Cooney, supra note 280, at
606 (arguing that MDL courts lack the power to effect permanent transfers because the MDL
Act requires a remand of all cases that are not terminated during pretrial proceedings);
Rhodes, supra note 280, at 734-42 (arguing that the language and legislative history of§ 1407
preclude transfer decisions by the MDL court).
291. See Cooney, supra note 280, at 596, 601-02 (arguing that MDL courts have the
power to make substantive rulings only as 111J. adjunct to the discovery process and do not
have the power to make summary judgment rulings after the completion of discovery).
292. It is now well established that the MDL court has the power to effect permanent
transfers. See, e.g., Eckstein v. Balcor Fiim Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct 883 (1994); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir.
1971); In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, Detroit, Mich. on Aug. 16, 1987, 791 F.
Supp. 1204, 1209 (E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Bristol Bay Salmon Fishery, Alaska, Antitrust
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gives the MDL court the power to conduct coordinated "pretrial"
proceedings, not merely discovery proceedings.293 MDL courts
should have the power to effect permanent transfers because, as
Part m demonstrates, such transfers change the federal law applicable to the case. Therefore, transfer decisions should be made as
early in the case as practicable and should not be postponed until
the case is remanded.
MDL judges should have the, power to rule on substantive motions because there is an inherent connection between discovery
rulings and other pretrial rulings. For example, when jurisdictional
questions are at issue, courts often limit discovery to such issues and
allow broader discovery to proceed only after they determine that
jurisdiction exists.294 Rule 12(b)(6) motions must be determined at
the outset of cases so that the parties will know with regard to what
claims. their discovery is relevant.295 Prohibiting the MDL court
from dealing with such pretrial matters would substantially limit the
efficacy of consolidated discovery proceedings.
The MDL judge's power to decide dispositive substantive issues,
however, does not imply that Congress intended MDL transfers to
have outcome-determinative effects. As long as the MDL court applies the law of the ultimate trial forum to all pretrial matters, there
are no outcome-determinative effects. Because it is possible to allow MDL judges substantive powers without affecting outcomes,
the choice of law problem must be resolved on 'the basis of independent considerations.296 As demonstrated above, these conLitig., 424 F. Supp. 504, 507 (J.P.M.L. 1976). MDL courts also have the power to entertain
substantive motions. See, e.g., Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1124 (motion to dismiss); In re Donald J,
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219
(1994); Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1172 (motion for partial summary judgment); Zinser v.
Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 757 (10th Cir. 1981) (motion to dismiss), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 941 (1982); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 406 n.5 (2d Cir.
1975) (same); Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 668 (6th Cir. 1973) (summary judgment
motion), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 463 F.2d
1017, 1018 n.2 (6th Cir. 1972) (same); Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 558 & n.2 (D.NJ.
1982) (motion to amend pleadings to add a punitive damages claim). The JPML is empowered to promulgate rules governing MDL cases as long as these rules are "not inconsistent
with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1988).
Rule 14 of the MDL Rules, which governs remand of MDL cases, expressly contemplates
that the MDL judge has the power to grant permanent transfers and dismiss claims on the
merits, including the power to dismiss claims on summary judgment. See R.~. Juo. PANEL
MULTIDISTRicr Lmo. 14(a)-(b), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1407 note (1988)•
.293. 28U.S.C.§1407(a) (1988).
294. See Cooney, supra note 280, at 602 (arguing that MDL courts have the power to
decide threshold legal questions to narrow the scope of discovery).
295. See Rhodes, supra note 280, at 725 (arguing that MDL judges should decide dismissal motions before "forg[ing] ahead with discovery").
296. The fact that there is no inconsistency between the broad pretrial powers granted to
MDL judges and the application of transferee federal law is demonstrated by Judge Weigel's
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siderations support the application of transferor federal law in
MDL cases.
B. Attempts to Reduce the Efficiency Costs of Applying
Transferee Law
The proponents of the rule that transferee federal law should
apply in the MDL context recognize that such a rule has the potential to waste substantial judicial resources if the decisions of the
MDL court are reexamined after remand. They argue that this efficiency cost is not high for two reasons. First, most cases terminate
in the MDL forum and are never remanded to the original forum.
Second, if a remand is required, the law of the case doctrine will
protect the rulings made during the MDL stage of the case. As
demonstrated below, these arguments do not justify departing from
the view that transferor federal law should apply in MDL cases.

1. Likelihood of Remand
The MDL Act does not require a remand to the original forum
if the case terminates in the MDL court or is permanently transferred during pretrial proceedings.2 97 As a practical matter, over
seventy percent of all MDL cases never return to their original fora
for trial.2 98 Thus, the potential waste of judicial resources seems
confined to about one-quarter of the cases transferred by the
JPML.299 Consequently, the proponents of the Korean Air Lines
support of both propositions. See Weigel, supra note 272, at 581-83 (arguing that MDL
judges have the power to effect permanent transfers and to decide dispositive pretrial motions, including "motions for judgment approving a settlement, for dismissal, for judgment on
the pleadings, for summary judgment, for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) ... and to
quash service of process" (footnotes omitted)); id. at 584 & n.70 ("[T]he transferee court
must consider the impact of its decisions if and when the transferred cases are returned to the
originating courts for trial. And the transferee court must apply the substantive law of the
transferor forum •.••" (footnote omitted)). Among the cases cited by Judge Weigel on the
choice of law issue are the Plumbing Fixtures and Philadelphia Housing Authority cases that
initially established the rule that transferor federal law applies in MDL cases. See id. at n.70;
supra section 11.A.2.
297. See, e.g., Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 762 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the district court did not err in refusing to remand cases that were dismissed on the
merits), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); see also Cooney, supra note 280, at 607-08
("[T]ransferee courts have usually attempted to decide all substantive issues in the
litigation.").
,
298. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.9 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (citing authority showing that as of June 1986 about 73% of MDL cases had terminated in the MDL court), affd. sub nom Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989);
Diana E. Murphy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints in Multidistrict Litigation, 132
F.R.D. 597, 603 & n.3 (1991) (noting that as of June 1990 about 20% of MDL cases had been
remanded); Steinman, supra note 258, at 700 & n.411 (noting that as of June 1985 about 22%
of MDL cases had been remanded).
299. See Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176 n.9; Marcus, supra note 17, at 6~1.
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result argue that transferee federal law should apply in MDL proceedings because the application of transferor federal law has efficiency costs of its own.300
This analysis is flawed for four reasons. First, the empirical results demonstrate that a substantial number of cases are remanded.301 In the approximately twenty-five percent of MDL cases
that are remanded, the potential waste of judicial resources is
large.302 As demonstrated below, the costs of applying transferor
federal law in the MDL context, though not negligible, are small by
comparison. As a result, there is no reason to tolerate the costs
associated with the need to reexamine previously decided questions, even in the one-quarter of MDL cases that are remanded.
Second, the proponents of the Korean Air Lines rule have underestimated the relative efficiency cost in remanded cases because
they have examined the wrong universe of cases in arguing that the
cost of the rule is limited to about twenty-five percent of MDL
cases. The total universe of cases against which the remanded cases
are compared should exclude cases that are permanently transferred to the MDL court pursuant to section 1404(a). If a case is
permanently transferred to the MDL court, MDL choice of law
rules are irrelevant. As demonstrated in Part III, the law of the
MDL circuit should then apply because this circuit is the ultimate
appellate venue. MDL choice of law rules are relevant only in
cases that have the potential to return to their original venue or are
permanently transferred to a third venue outside the MDL circuit.303 In comparing efficiency gains and losses from the competing choice of law rules, we must examine the universe of cases in
which the selection of a choice of law rule has relevance, not the
universe of all MDL cases.
Third, the total universe of cases against which the percentage
of remanded cases should be compared should also exclude cases
that terminated prior to any significant legal proceedings in the
MDL court.304 For example, many cases can be expected to termi300. See infra section IV.C.
301. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1159.
302. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 229-32, 268-69.
303. To the extent that cases are permanently transferred during coordinated pretrial
proceedings to a circuit other than that in which the cases arose or in which the MDL court
sits, the law of the ultimate transferee forum should apply during the MDL proceedings, as
demonstrated in Part III.
304. One commentator suggests that we should eliminate from the universe of total MDL
cases all cases that are terminated by voluntary dismissal, settlement, and procedural irregularities. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 1159. Although this commentator assumes that no
substantive rulings are made in such cases, see id. at 1159 n.124, this conclusion is inaccurate.
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nate in the MDL court as a result of voluntary settlement.3os To the
extent that these settlements occurred before the onset of significant legal proceedings, the relative efficiency costs of the competing
choice of law rules have no relevance, and these cases should be
eliminated from the analysis.306
Fourth, the Korean Air Lines rule affects more than the twentyfive percent of cases that are ultimately remanded. If transferee
federal law applies in the MDL context, some cases will be dismissed that would not have been dismissed in the original forum.
Thus, applying transferee law will affect settlement value. Because
the MDL scheme adopted by Congress suggests that Congress did
not intend MDL transfers to have outcome-determinative effects,
the Korean Air Lines rule is subject to challenge on more than just
efficiency grounds.
The fact that termination in the MDL court precludes a remand
represents a glitch in the statutory scheme. If an MDL district
court grants a dispositive motion dismissing an entire case, an appeal lies from the final judgment to the court of appeals that supervises the MDL court.307 If this circuit court affirms the dismissal,
the case terminates in the MDL venue and is never remanded to
the original forum. This result poses a number of problems for the
position that MDL courts should apply transferor federal law.
For example, any number of rulings can be made prior to settlement. To the extent that these
rulings are made pursuant to transferee federal law in the MDL court, the efficiency costs
associated with the application of transferor federal law are avoided and there are no costs
associated with the application of transferee federal law. The only cases that should be eliminated from the analysis are those that are in fact terminated prior to any substantive
proceedings.
305. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Four Seasons Sec.
Laws Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219, 227 n.12 (W.D. Okla. 1974); Donald J. McLachlan, The Multidistrict Litigation Act: The Demise of Venue, 49 Cm. B. REc. 367, 369 (1968) (noting that
out of the hundreds of consolidated price-fixing cases that inspired the MDL Act, "only a
handful resulted in trial and only five went to judgment").
306. One might also eliminate from the total universe of MDL cases those cases in which
no conflict exists between the MDL and transferor circuits. In this circumstance, the competing choice oflaw rules are also irrelevant. Were we to take this approach, however, we would
also have to eliminate remanded cases in which no circuit conflict existed. Because there is
no reason to believe that cases without a federal law conflict terminate or survive termination
disproportionately in the MDL court, this factor can probably be ignored.
307. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122 (1989); Glasstech, Inc. v. AB Kyro OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1576-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 87 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Eckstein v. Balcer
Fiim Investors, 740 F. Supp. 572, 574-75 (E.D. WIS. 1990); In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum
Coil Litig., 538 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D. Minn.), mandamus denied, 705 F.2d 980 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Marcus, supra note 17, at 682; Cooney, supra note 280, at 591.
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Because the case is not remanded, there are no efficiency costs
attendant to the MDL district and circuit courts' applying their own
law. By contrast? the efficiency concerns inherent in the application
of transferor federal law, though small, remain.308 Especially significant is the lack of any opportunity to have the transferor circuit
pass on the content of its own law. Moreover, the appellate model
suggests that the ultimate venue of appeal determines the applicable federal law. In this class of cases, the final appellate venue at
the circuit court level lies in the MDL circuit.
However, applying transferee circuit law in this context poses its
own problems. Determining the final appellate venue depends on
the substantive result in the MDL circuit court. If the MDL circuit
court affirms the judgment of dismissal, it is the ultimate appellate
venue and the .case is never remanded. But if the MDL circuit
court reyerses the judgment and holds that the MDL district court
erred in dismissing the complaint, the case will be remanded to the
original forum for trial and an appeal to the transferor circuit.
Choice of federal law cannot be made to depend on the substantive
result in the transferee circuit court.
Applying transferee law also distinguishes irrationally between
final and interlocutory judgments. In our hypothetical, if the plaintiff asserts a section 14(a) claim based solely on allegations of negligence, MDL courts applying the Sixth Circuit's scienter
requirement would dismiss this claim, and no remand would be required. If the complaint alleges both negligence and scienter, however, dismissing the negligence count does not prevent the case
from being remanded for trial, with any appeal following trial occurring in the Second Circuit.309
Applying transferee federal law when the MDL circuit court is
the final appellate venue also unfairly favors defendants. If the defendant succeeds in getting an entire complaint dismissed in the
courts of the MDL circuit, this result is final and not subject to reexamination. If the MDL courts permit the plaintiff to proceed, however, the defendant gets a second bite at the apple after remand.
Thus, the defendant wins if the courts in either circuit are convinced
to dismiss the case. The plaintiff must win in both circuits to be
allowed to try the case.
308. See infra section IV.C.
309. A judgment is not final and appealable unless it disposes of all the claims between
all the parties to the litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also infra note 314 and accompanying text.
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Consistency with the rest of the MDL scheme requires that the
MDL district and circuit courts apply transferor federal law even in
cases that will not be remanded. Congress would do well to remedy
this glitch in the legislative scheme. To solve this problem, Congress should amend the MDL Act to provide that after the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, courts shall remand all cases to their
original fora unless they have been permanently transferred as part
of the MDL proceedings.
2. Law of the Case
Because the argument based on the possibility that cases will
not be remanded is weak, the proponents of the application of
transferee federal law in the MDL context rely on the law of the
case doctrine to protect decisions in the MDL circuit from reexamination and reversal. According to the law of the case doctrine, previous decisions in the same case should generally not be
reexamined.310 Applying transferee federal law in MDL cases involves reduced efficiency costs if the ultimate trial forum and its
appellate court are required to defer to MDL rulings.
The law of the case doctrine is insufficient to make the Korean
Air Lines result acceptable from an efficiency standpoint. Initially,
the law of the case doctrine applies only between courts of coordinate rank.311 In the context of our hypothetical, unappealed rulings
by an MDL district court in the Sixth Circuit would be entitled to
no deference by the Second Circuit after remand. Any other rule
would insulate the unappealed rulings of the MDL district court
from any appellate review, a result the federal system cannot tolerate.312 A trial judge in the Second Circuit would be unlikely to defer to MDL district court rulings that make appellate reversal
likely. In this context, the law of the case doctrine does nothing to
mitigate the efficiency losses flowing from the application of MDL
circuit law.
·
Recognizing this last conclusion, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg argued in a concurring opinion in the Korean Air Lines case that interlocutory appeals should be allowed as a matter of course to the
MDL circuit court on outcome-determinative federal issues.313
310. For a discussion of the law of the case doctrine, see Steinman, supra note 258, at 597613.
311. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 {1988).
312. See 486 U.S. at 817 ("[A] district court's adherence to law of the case cannot insulate
an issue from appellate review •..•").
313. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S.
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1his practice is open to a number of objections. It violates the final
judgment rule that is the cornerstone of federal appellate jurisdiction.314 Interlocutory appeals are generally allowed only in exceptional circumstances.31s In the MDL context, the most important
exception to the final judgment rule involves the district court's
ability to certify a nonfinal disposition for interlocutory appeal,
which the court of appeals has the discretion to accept or deny. 31 6
Federal appellate courts have allowed discretionary interlocutory
appeals only sparingly.311
The final judgment rule reflects a congressional desire to prevent the delays inherent in piecemeal appellate litigation.318 It
reduces the number of appellate issues because the winning party
has no need to appeal319 and, after the conclusion of a lengthy trial
process, only the most significant errors are worthy of appeal and
reversal.320 Nothing in the MDL Act suggests that Congress in122 {1989). Interlocutory appeals from decisions of the MDL court are to its own court of
appeals. See, e.g., Glasstech, Inc. v. AB Kyro OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1576·78 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Astarte Shipping Co. v. Allied Steel & Export Serv., 767 F.2d 86, 87 {5th Cir. 1985); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Eckstein v. Balcor
Film Investors, 740 F. Supp. 572, 574-75 (E.D. Wis. 1990); In re Exterior Siding & Aluminum
Coil Litig., 538 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D. Minn.), mandamus denied, 105 F.2d 980 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983). This rule is consistent with the notion that after a § 1407 transfer
the MDL court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. See Eckstein, 140 F. Supp. at 575.
One commentator has recently supported an expanded use of the interlocutory appeals
mechanism in mass tort cases. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in
the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1205-09 {1990).
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 {1988). A judgment is final if it ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing but execution to be completed. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S.
495, 497 (1989). A judgment is final only if it disposes of all claims between all parties to a
litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). The district court has the power to deem final a sepa·
rate judgment that disposes of one or more but less than all of the claims between the parties.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 54{b). There have occasionally been proposals to eliminate appeals as of
right even from final judgments in civil cases. See, e.g., Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539 {1932) (arguing that appeals should be
allowed only in the discretion of the appellate court); cf. Irving Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are
They Useful in the Administration ofJustice?, 56 GEO. LJ. 417 (1968) (questioning the value
of appellate review).
315. See Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 717, 729.47 (1993) (examining the exceptions
to the final judgment rule).
316. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) {1988).
317. See Milbert v. Bison Lab., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 {3d Cir. 1958) (supporting the
limitation of interlocutory appeals to "exceptional cases"); Martineau, supra note 315, at 733·
34 {discussing how courts have restricted interlocutory appeals to "big, exceptional" cases);
Solimine, supra note 313, at 1193-99 (same).
318. See, e.g., Firestone Ttre & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 {1981); Solimine,
supra note 313, at 1168 ("Powerful efficiency arguments support limiting appeals to final
judgments.").
319. See Solimine, supra note 313, at 1168.
320. It is worth noting that to some extent the final judgment rule values the time of
appellate courts more than the time of trial courts. The final judgment rule requires the trial
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tended to alter the normal rules of appellate jurisdiction in the
MDL context.321 Moreover, although Judge Ginsburg assumes that
outcome-determinative issues will be small in number, this result is
hardly obvious.322
Judge Ginsburg's interlocutory appeals solution is also incomplete. Because he recognizes that interlocutory appeals cann~t be
provided on all issues decided by the MDL district court, Judge
Ginsburg restricts the category of issues entitled to such appeals to
outcome-determinative issues. As a consequence, on many issues
the decisions of the MDL district court must be subject to reexamination and reversal after remand. The incomplete nature of Judge
Ginsburg's scheme leads to the anomalous result that the law of
different circuits will apply to different issues in the same case:
MDL circuit law will apply to outcome-determinative issues - assuming that after remand the transferor circuit court accords law of
the case status to decisions of the MDL circuit court - and transferor circuit law will apply after remand on issues that were not
deserving of an interlocutory appeal. Nothing in the MDL Act or
common sense sanctions such a schizophrenic result.323
Judge Ginsburg's interlocutory appeals solution might also be
difficult to apply. In some guises, the standard of fault applicable to
a section 14(a) claim would be outcome determinative. For example, if the plaintiff alleges negligence alone, the entire case turns on
-the standard of fault issue. On the other hand, if the plaintiff also
court to hold trials that may tum out after an appeal to have been unnecessary or to retry
cases that the appellate court later finds were tainted with significant error. A contrary rule
is neither unthinkable nor obviously inefficient For example, New York allows an appeal as
of right from all interlocutory judgments and most interlocutory orders. See N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
L. & R. § 570l{a){l)-(2) (McKinney 1978). New York does so because it values the time of
trial courts more than the time of appellate courts. See also Solimine, supra note 313, at
1178-80 (supporting an increase in the number of federal interlocutory appeals to conserve
the trial court's resources).
321. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341, 1343-45 {7th Cir.) (refusing to entertain an interlocutory appeal in an MDL case because the appropriate venue for
appeal is in the transferor circuit after final judgment), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971).
322. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that interlocutory appeals are available in
MDL cases to resolve "those few outcome-determinative rulings of the transferee district
court"), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989). Judge Ginsburg's assumption is especially questionable because he means to allow interlocutory appeals
on all federal issues with a substantial impact on the outcome rather than merely dispositive
issues. See infra text accompanying note 324.
323. Although courts often use depei;age to designate different state law to govern different issues in the same case, see Brackin, supra note 198, at 674 & n.87, this result arises from
the need to accommodate the competing interests of a number of sovereigns, which may vary
depending on the issue. See id. at 674. Because such sovereignty concerns are irrelevant in
the federal system, the federal courts have no reason to utilize such a confusing procedure
with respect to federal issues.
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alleges scienter, the decision is not necessarily outcome determinative. In this regard, it is worth noting that Korean Air Lines itself
did not involve a dispositive issue. Whether Korean Air Lines was
entitled to avail itself of the damage limitation provisions of an international treaty governed the scope of its potential exposure but
did not definitively resolve any pending claims. Because Judge
Ginsburg supported an interlocutory appeal on this issue, one must
assume that he also means to allow interlocutory appeals on significant nondispositive issues.324
Perhaps significant nondispositive issues will seldom need to be
decided in the MDL court. The core job of the MDL court, however, is presiding over consolidated discovery. Discovery in federal
court is confined to relevant evidence or evidence that is likely to
lead to relevant evidence.325 Relevance is determined according to
what the substantive law defines as the elements of the plaintiff's
claims and the defendant's defenses. Even if discovery is relevant,
a discovery judge has the power to grant protective orders.326
Many of these discovery decisions cannot be made without addressing central substantive issues in the case.
The law of the case solution to the efficiency concerns attendant
to applying MDL circuit law is also problematic because the law of
the case doctrine is far from absolute. All interlocutory decisions
are subject to reexamination prior to final judgment.327 Although
the law of the case doctrine provides a fully sufficient reason for
refusing to reexamine decisions made at an earlier stage in the case,
it does not always prohibit such reexamination.328 Among the wellrecognized exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are rulings
viewed as clearly erroneous.329 Decisions that are clearly contrary
to the precedents of the ultimatfi appellate forum would qualify as
manifestly erroneous and jus~ departure from law of the case
principles.33o In our hypothetjcal, if a plaintiff brought a section
324. See Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1180 (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring).
325. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b){l).
326. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
327. See FED. R. Crv. P. 54{b).
328. See Arizona v. Califomfa, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) ("Law of the case directs a
court's discretion, it does not limit the tribunal's power.").
329. See, e.g., Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8; Robinson v. Parrish, 720 F.2d 1548, 1550 n.•
(11th Cir. 1983); Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 290 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982); Crane
Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 1979).
330. See Steinman, supra note 258, at 704 (noting that to the extent MDL transferor
courts have jurisdiction to reexamine decisions in the MDL circuit and apply their own law
on remand, such courts are permitted to depart from law of the case principles with respect
to decisions that are contrary to transferor circuit law).
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14(a) claim founded on both negligence and scienter and an MDL
court in Ohio dismissed the negligence counts, the Sixth Circuit
would affirm on interlocutory appeal. Because the scienter counts
remain, however, the case would be remanded to a district court in
New York for trial. On appeal from the final judgment, the Second
Circuit would probably refuse to defer to the Sixth Circuit with regard to the dismissal of the negligence claim because, based on existing Second Circuit precedent, this decision is manifestly an error.
Finally, it bears noting that at the circuit court level the law of
the case doctrine is often honored more in the breach than in the
observance. To take but one stark example, the Supreme Court has
twice been faced with confiic~ing appellate decisions in the transfer
context. In both cases, an appellate court in the original forum provided for the transfer of a case to another circuit. In both cases, the
transferee appellate court transferred the case back to its original
venue. The first time the Supreme Court faced the issue of federal
appellate courts playing this elaborate game of procedural ping
pong, it suggested that the discretionary aspects of the law of the
case doctrine permitted this result. 331 The second time it faced the
issue, the Supreme Court suggested that the second appellate court
should ordinarily defer to the first in the interest of procedural harmony.332 The latter Supreme Court decision surely expresses the
better view. But if federal circuit courts are uncomfortable in accepting transfer results from other circuit courts, which present the
strongest case for deference, one should be sanguine regarding the
likelihood of deference on other issues when the ultimate appellate
court has the ability to have the last word at the circuit court
level.333
Although I do not believe that the law of the case doctrine satisfactorily resolves the efficiency concerns inherent in applying transferee federal law in MDL cases, I do not mean to suggest that the
331. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960).
332. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1988).
333. The difficulty with assuming that the law of the case doctrine will insulate MDL
circuit rulings after remand is demonstrated by the fact that Judge Ginsburg, who made this
assumption, see In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1180-81
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd. sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 {1989), also believes that for the MDL scheme to work properly, Congress
should amend the statute "to provide that rulings by a court in one circuit will not be reviewed under the case law of another circuit," 829 F.2d at 1184-85. As suggested above, the
preferable way to resolve potential appellate confiicts would be to require the MDL courts to
apply transferor law and provide that all MDL cases shall be remanded so that the transferor
circuit always has ultimate appellate jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 307-09.
According to this approach, interlocutory appeals would be rare, and confiicts between appellate courts would be kept to a minimum.
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law of the case doctrine has no role to play in such cases. As long
as the MDL judge makes an honest effort to apply the law of the
transferor court of appeals, after remand the trial judge has no
more cause to reexamine these interlocutory decisions than if they
had been made by another judge on his court. If the MDL circuit
decides an interlocutory appeal in accordance with the transferor
circuit's law, after remand the transferor circuit should accord this
decision substantial deference just as it would an interlocutory decision by a different panel of its own court. This process is faithful to
the MDL Act's assumption that transfers do not change applicable
federal law as well as the efficiency concerns that motivate the law
of the case doctrine.334
Moreover, discovery decisions by the MDL trial and appellate
courts should be treated with substantial deference after remand.
Conducting consolidated discovery is at the core of the MDL function and involves substantial discretion. Discretionary decisions
present a strong claim for application of the law of the case doctrine.335 Parties challenging discovery rulings on an interlocutory
basis have had some success in surmounting the final judgment
rule.336 The courts are somewhat more likely to allow interlocutory
app'eals on discovery questions because the harm of an erroneous
ruling is often irremediable. When an MDL circuit hears an interlocutory appeal on discovery issues that cannot wait until the conclusion of the case to be resolved, the transferor circuit should
rarely revisit such issues. But to preserve the sense of the MDL
scheme, and in the interest of applying a uniform law to the entire
cas~, the MDL courts should also apply transferor circuit law to
discovery questions.
C. The Costs of Applying Transferor Law

Proponents of the Korean Air Lines result argue that applying
transferor federal law to MDL cases has substantial costs and is
contrary to fundamental assumptions of the federal system. The
following sections examine these arguments and find them to be
without substantial merit.
334. See Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 558 n.3, 559 n.5 (D.N.J. 1982) (recognizing
simultaneously that an MDL court is required to follow transferor federal law and that its
decisions are entitled to law of the case deference on remand).
335. See Steinman, supra note 258, at 601 ("[S)ome issues, most notably questions of fact
and matters of discretion, are particularly unsuited for reconsideration ••••").
336. See RICHARD H. FIEID ET AL, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC CoURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 590-92 {6th ed. 1990).
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1. Applying the Law of Another Circuit

Proponents of the Korean Air Lines rule argue that a contrary
rule imposes unacceptable costs on the MDL district and appellate
courts in attempting to divine the law of the transferor appellate
circuit.337 Should the courts adopt the position that transferor federal law applies in MDL cases, the MDL court would be required to
predict the law that the transferor circuit court would apply. This
predictive task is notoriously difficult in the analogous Erie context,
where federal courts are required to predict the law that the relevant state's highest court would apply.338 Although such practical
difficulties are inherent in the Erie scheme, they are avoidable in
the MDL context with respect to federal issues. Applying transferee federal law in the MDL context would eliminate such
difficulties.
There are, however, two features that distinguish the MDL federal issue context from the Erie context. First, a federal MDL court
is in a far better position to apply transferor circuit law than state
law.339 Although in some sense both are "foreign law" - that is,
law the judge does not deal with on a daily basis - MDL judges
should at least be familiar with the general structure of federal law
even if they do not know the particular answers provided by the
transferor circuit. Moreover, an MDL judge would divine the law
of the transferor circuit just as the transferor district court would
have: by researching that circuit's relevant precedents. The facility
of federal judges with the law of other circuits is demonstrated by
the fact that federal judges often sit by designation on courts of
appeals outside their home circuits.340
Second, unlike Erie, the MDL scheme usually provides a
method to ensure that the MDL judge correctly predicts the law
that the transferor circuit would apply. After remand and trial, the
transferor circuit will itself get to pronounce on the correctness of
337. See Korean Air Lines, 829F.2d1182-83 (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that
it is more difficult for a district judge to apply the law of another circuit than state law);
Marcus, supra note 17, at 713-14.
338. See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.)
(complaining that "[o]ur principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine
what the New York courts would think the california courts would think on an issue about
which neither has thought"), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
339. See Fossett Corp. v. Gearhart, 694 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (concluding
that it would be easier "for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas to apply
Seventh Circuit precedent than it would be for this court to apply Texas law").
340. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(a), 292(d) (1988) (giving the Chief Justice of the United States
the power to designate circuit and district judges for service on courts of appeals outside their
home circuits). ·
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the decisions of the MDL judge. In the Erie context, it is possible
to ascertain the position of the relevant state's highest court on disputed issues only in exceptional circumstances.341 As a consequence, the efficiency costs of applying transferor federal law in the
MDL context are much smaller than the analogous costs in the Erie
context.
2. Distinguishing Substance from Procedure
Requiring the MDL court to apply transferor law presents a second problem that has Erie analogies. Courts apply their own law
on issues of "procedure" based on their inherent duty to regulate
housekeeping matters in their own courtrooms.342 In the Erie context, distinguishing substance from procedure has been particularly
vexing.343 The proponents of the Korean Air Lines result argue that
this problem should not be introduced into federal question transfer cases.344
The substance versus procedure problem in the federal issue
context is not of the same magnitude as in the Erie context because
all federal courts are required to follow the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Nevertheless, the problem is not insignificant because
there is still substantial room for disagreement among the circuits
on procedural matters. Different circuits have different interpreta341. See, e.g., Bethpage Lutheran Serv. v. Weiker, 965 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that certification procedures should be used infrequently).
342. See Steinman, supra note 258, at 630 (noting that the Erie analogy suggests that
"federal courts having federal question jurisdiction over transferred cases also may use their
own procedural rules").
343. The law in this area seems to have come to an uneasy resting place based on a threepronged test that represents a compromise among competing values. Federal law controls
any issue that lies within the domain of a valid federal statute or rule. See Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965). If no valid federal statute or rule applies, and an important federal
policy interest is at stake, the interests of the federal government are balanced against the
interests of the relevant state government in determining which law to apply. See Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). If no federal statute or rule is
applicable and no significant federal policy interest is involved, state law applies on all issues
that are likely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the case. See Guaranty 'Ihlst
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). This uneasy compromise has arisen, in large part, because
the Supreme Court desired to give greater scope to federal law in diversity cases than Guaranty Trust allowed but was unwilling to overrule Guaranty Trust or its progeny. In Hanna,
the Court created the three-pronged structure that currently reigns to avoid overruling its
prior cases. Subsequent to Hanna, the Court has continued to refuse to overrule cases from
the Guaranty Trust era. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (refusing to
overrule Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)); Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (refusing to overrule Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Blee. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). Avoiding such complexities in federal question cases is
a consummation devoutly to be wished.
344. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 714-16.
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tions of the Federal Rules,345 and each district court is allowed to
promulgate additional procedural rules to the extent that such rules
are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules.346 There is, however,
no guarantee that district courts will promulgate rules that are consistent with each other. Moreover, the circuits have often differed
on doctrines that flow from sources other than the Federal Rules
but can be viewed as procedural.347
In the Erie context, the need to distinguish substance from procedure arises from the claims of competing sovereigns. The Erie
decision rests in part on the desire to protect state sovereignty from
encroachment by a federal government that is supposed to have
limited powers.348 Later decisions gave federal courts broader
scope to apply their own law in diversity cases to implement the
Constitution's enabling clauses and the Supremacy Clause, which
serve to restrict state sovereignty.349 Because there are no similar
federalism concerns in the MDL context, there is no need to distinguish substance from procedure.350 In the interest of simplicity, a
single circuit's law should apply to all issues, whether substantive or
procedural.351 Because efficiency considerations and congressional
intent suggest that transferor circuit law should apply on substantive questions, there is no reason not to extend this result to the
procedural context.352 This result eliminates any costs attendant to
procedure-substance differentiation.
345. See id. at 715 & n.225 (describing conflicting views on the requirements for class
action certification under rule 23 and protective orders under rule 26(c)).
346. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
347. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 17, at 716 (discussing injunction standards and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment in the limitations context).
348. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
349. See supra note 343.
350. See Dreyfuss, supra note 163, at 38 n.220 (arguing that the "principle of equivalency
between circuits and states is specious"); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 221, at 833 ("[I]t
cannot be plausibly maintained that the courts of appeals have the status of independent
courts representing an authority sovereign over their geographic territories."); Schaefer,
supra note 220, at 454 ("There is no element of sovereignty in a federal judicial circuit."); cf.
Laurie R. Wallach, Note, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judgments, 95 YALE LJ. 1500, 1501 (1986) (noting "[t]he unique status of circuits - something
'less' sovereign than states but 'more' than mere coordinate courts").
351. For example, although statute of limitations questions can be viewed as either procedural or substantive, see supra note 206, federal courts deciding which circuit's Jaw to apply
on such questions in the transfer context have generally ignored the procedure-substance
distinction, see supra note 191. But see Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp. 69, 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (treating limitations questions as procedural and applying Jaw of the forum).
352. The MDL court would, of necessity, retain the power to apply its own rules on
purely housekeeping matters - for example, the typeface conventions for briefs. Thus, even
under the regime proposed in the text, the MDL judge would still be required to distinguish
between procedural matters of a purely housekeeping nature and other procedural matters.
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3. Reducing the Benefits of Consolidation
Proponents of the Korean Air Lines result argue that applying
transferor federal law in MDL cases reduces the benefits of consolidation because the MDL court might have to apply conflicting federal rules to cases that originated in different circuits.353 There is
little question that applying transferor law in the MDL circuit does
reduce the benefits of consolidation. Nevertheless, applying the
law of several circuits to a single issue does not entirely eliminate
the benefits of consolidation. It is more efficient for a single court
to analyze a single problem and then research the answer according
to the precedents of a number of circuits than for numerous district
judges to analyze the problem separately under their own circuits'
laws.
Moreover, the efficiency of conducting consolidated proceedings has seldom been a paramount goal of the procedural system.
A number of other rules limit the facility of collective litigation to
accomplish more significant procedural objectives. The rules of
subject matter jurisdiction prevent diversity plaintiffs from aggregating their claims to reach the jurisdictional limit.354 Rules of personal jurisdiction often prevent the consolidation of related
cases.355 In state law cases, constitutional limitations on state
choice of law rules inhibit the facility of the class action
mechanism.356
Congress's approach to the MDL problem also suggests that
preserving the law of the transferor forum is a more significant conThis fact eloquently testifies to the inherent impossibility of eliminating entirely the
procedure-substance dichotomy.
353. See Marcus, supra note 17, at 716-19; Murphy, supra note 298, at 608 ("Application
of the law of the transferor court can be a very complicated process ••• in cases where there
are transfers from a number of different courts and jurisdictions.").
354. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 {1973). The lower courts are
divided on whether the new supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 {1988 &
Supp. II 1990), has supplanted Zahn. Compare, e.g., Patterson Enters., Inc. v. Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that § 1367 overrules Zahn)
with Averdick v. Republic Fm. Servs., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 37, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1992) {holding
that Zahn survives § 1367).
355. Prior to the enactment of the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 {1988)
(originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1335, 62 Stat. 869, 931), obligors were
often unable to join competing claimants in a single action. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 521-22 {1916).
356. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 {1985) (holding that a state
court could not apply its own law to thousands of related cases in the class action context
because it lacked a " 'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' " to some of
the cases (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 {1981) {plurality opinion))).
For an analysis of Phillips's impact on class actions, see Arthur R. Miller & David Crump,
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law after Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 57-67
(1986).
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cem than preserving inviolate the benefits of MDL consolidation.
By providing for a return of cases to their original fora for trial,
Congress indicated that achieving uniformity of results was not
among its most important goals. As demonstrated above, the MDL
Act involved consolidation for limited purposes principally related
to discovery and was not intended to have outcome-determinative
effects. Indeed, on state law issues, the Van Dusen rule often precludes the application of a single law to MDL cases.357 I see no
reason to distinguish the federal law ·MDL context from others in
which the efficiency concerns inherent in consolidated litigation are
secondary to more significant procedural concems.358
4. Departing from the Principle of Competence

Perhaps the most significant charge against the application of
transferor federal law in the MDL context is theoretical rather than
practical. Whereas the appellate model incorporates Marcus's competence principle in the permanent transfer context, it is in conflict
with this principle in the MDL context. The appellate model precludes the MDL court, and its circuit court, from applying their best
views of federal law in light of the pronouncements of Congress and
the Supreme Court. The appellate model requires the MDL courts
to defer to the views of the transferor circuit.
·
The competence principle contains two elements: the ability
and the duty of federal judges to determine federal law correctly.
The first element is essentially a tautology. By definition, all American courts, including state courts, have the ability to determine federal law correctly. The second element is arguable.359 In cases that
are not transferred, according to the currently prevailing view, the
357. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.P.R.
1990) (noting that in mass tort litigation, "the application of choice of law standards turns
into a colossal struggle for the transferee court"); In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F.
Supp. 732, 740 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (commenting on the" 'judicial nightmare known as Conflicts
of Laws' " in an MDL mass tort proceeding (quoting Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d
608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added))); Symeon C. Symeonides, The ALi's Complex
Litigation Project: Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L REv. 843, 853 (1994) ("[T]he
existing system seems to be very near the crashing point under the combined weight of Erie,
Klaxon, Van Dusen, and Ferens." (footnotes omitted)); Weinberg, supra note 205, at 710 &
n.156 (arguing that "Van Dusen, for consolidated cases in federal court .•. ha[s] produced
what writers today quite rightly call 'mass litigation disaster,' " and collecting authorities).
358. See In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (D. Colo.
1987) (perceiving "a great deal of sense in applying the law of a single forum to all § 1407
issues (whether state or federal) so that the advantages of multidistrict litigation may be
pursued to their logical conclusions," but applying transferor federal law based on the current MDL scheme).
359. See Fmi, supra note 25, at 80 (noting that the "competence principle is not helpful
because Van Dusen does not speak to competence; rather, it speaks to appropriateness").
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benefits of intercircuit dialogue justify the competence principle at
the circuit court level. For cases that are permanently transferred,
there is no reason to depart from the competence principle and, as
Part ill demonstrates, substantial reason to support it.
Moreover, the competence principle is not absolute within the
federal system. In 1982, Congress created the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.360 This court primarily361 has
jurisdiction over appeals when the jurisdiction of a federal district
court is founded in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which
provides for original subject matter jurisdiction over patent
cases.362 The Federal Circuit has held that it also has appellate jurisdiction over nonpatent issues in cases that are otherwise \vithin
its appellate jurisdiction.363 On federal nonpatent issues, however,
the Federal Circuit applies the federal law of the regional circuit
within which the district court sits.364 This practice enables the Federal Circuit to create the national patent law that Congress envisioned,365 avoid piecemeal appeals in patent cases, and avoid
changing the results on nonpatent issues that would never have
come before the Federal Circuit had there been no patent questions
in the case.
Just as the Federal Circuit has departed from the competence
principle to achieve other goals of the federal system, the MDL
context is sufficiently special to justify departure from this principle.
Applying transferor federal law in the MDL context furthers sub360. See Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (combining the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims to create the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
361. Although the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's primary significance lies in
the area of patent appeals, it also hears appeals in a number of other areas. See Dreyfuss,
supra note 163, at 4.
362. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l) (1988). In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has appellate jurisdiction in patent cases only when a federal patent issue appears on
the face of a well-pleaded complaint See 486 U.S. at 807-10.
363. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781F.2d861, 875-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (entertaining an antitrust claim); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 907-09
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (entertaining a trademark claim); Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg.
Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir.1984) (entertaining a disqualification of counsel claim).
The Federal Circuit also hears appeals within the scope of its appellate jurisdiction in cases
where no patent issues remain in the case. See Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper Inc., 800
F.2d 256, 258 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (entertaining an appeal when the patent issues in the case
had been dismissed); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir.1984) (entertaining an appeal when the patent issues in the case had been severed).
364. See Atari, 141 F.2d at 1439-40 (applying the rule to substantive issues); Panduit, 144
F.2d at 1574-75 (applying the rule to procedural issues). This deference has been criticized.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 163, at 37-46.
365. See Revesz, supra note 213, at 1167.
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stantial efficiency concerns and is faithful to Congress's purpose in
creating the MDL scheme. Moreover, departing from the competence principle in the MDL context does little injury to the policy
goal that animates it. The chief purpose of the competence principle at the appellate level is to encourage intercircuit dialogue.366
Such dialogue will proceed uninhibited in all but MDL cases and
accomplish most or all of its objectives.
It should also be noted that in the MDL context either choice of
law approach involves some compromise of the competence principle. The Korean Air Lines approach is premised in part on the ultimate appellate court's willingness to accord law of the case status to
interlocutory appellate rulings in the MDL circuit. This approach
precludes the ultimate appellate court from applying its best view of
federal law. The approach suggested by the appellate model would
require the MDL court, and its circuit, to apply transferor federal
law. Because some compromise of the competence principle is required, the appellate model's approach is preferable because it furthers efficiency goals as well as congressional intent.

D. Conclusion
In sum, the appellate model, which posits that the ultimate
venue of appeal identifies applicable federal law, should apply in
MDL cases and require the application of transferor federal law.
This choice of law approach is consistent with the MDL scheme,
which contemplates the return of cases to their original fora for trial
and furthers substantial efficiency goals by reducing the number of
MDL rulings that will have to be reexamined after any remand.
Attempts to reduce the efficiency costs of a contrary rule are unavailing. The fact that most MDL cases are not remanded is, by
itself, of little significance. The law of the case doctrine does not
eliminate the efficiency costs of applying transferee federal law because it does not apply to MDL district court rulings, requires interlocutory appeals to the MDL circuit, and does not ensure that the
rulings of the MDL circuit court will be respected after remand.
Finally, although the appellate model's approach presents some efficiency costs of its own, these costs are small in comparison to the
efficiency costs of the Korean Air Lines rule.

366. See supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Professor Marcus, Korean Air Lines, and their
progeny have arrived at a conclusion that is only half right. The
current consensus view, that transferee federal law should apply after all transfers of cases containing federal issues, is right in the context of permanent transfers but wrong in the context of MDL
transfers. With respect to federal issues, the venue of appeal determines choice of law by default. Neither the permanent transfer nor
MDL context presents any reason to depart from this principle. As
a consequence, transferee federal law should apply after permanent
transfers, and transferor federal law should apply after MDL transfers. These conclusions reflect the pre-Korean Air Lines consensus
of the federal courts, to which a return would be welcome.
The effect of transfer on choice of federal law will probably continue to be a difficult question for the foreseeable future. Although
resolution of the choice of law issue is within the Supreme Court's
province, this issue is peculiarly insulated from Supreme Court review. As Korean Air Lines itself demonstrates, whenever the
Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits, it usually renders the choice of law question moot.367 Once
the Supreme Court addresses the conflict on the merits, federal law
becomes uniform.
Perhaps the Court will exercise its role as supervisor of the
lower federal courts and provide some advice on the choice of law
question. For example, in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp.,368 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
relating to the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.369 In
the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court resolved the question
on the merits.370 It also gave advice to the inferior federal courts on
the handling of transfer decisions and strongly suggested that federal appellate courts should accord law of the case status to transfer
decisions emanating from other circuits.371 There is no reason the
Court could not give similar guidance the next time it resolves a
circuit conflict in the transfer context.
Given the difficulties surrounding Supreme Court action, Congress is in the best position to resolve the choice of law dilemma.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supra note 183.
486 U.S. 800 (1988).
See 486 U.S. at 806-07.
See 486 U.S. at 807-18.
See 486 U.S. at 818-19.
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The Rules of Decision Act372 is the font of choice of law in the Erie
context.373 There is no reason that Congress could not legislate the
federal law applicable to transferred cases. Congress would do well
to resolve this issue so that cases can proceed based on the express,
rather than the divined, intent of Congress. At the very least, Congress should amend the MDL Act to provide for a remand of all
MDL cases at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, including
cases that have been terminated on the merits.374 This procedure
would greatly increase the consistency of the current MDL scheme.

372. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1988).
373. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal
Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1109-13 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (discussing the interplay between Erie and
the Rules of Decision Act).
374. Cases that have pennanently transferred to the MDL court should be exempt from
this rule. Cases that have been permanently transferred to other districts pending the completion of MDL proceedings should be transferred to those districts at the conclusion of the
pretrial phase.

